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The Kurds in Turkey are main subjects in an ongoing debate on recognition, identity 
awareness and ethnic mobilization. Dealing with the Europeanization of minority 
rights, the thesis aims to highlight the EU’s role in contributing to increased 
recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic group, and what possible effects such a 
development may have. Particularly the issue of a more prominent identity awareness 
as a result of the recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic group, is pointed out as one 
main effect of Europeanization pressure on minority rights in Turkey.   
By the collection and analysis of semi-structured interviews pursued with young 
people of Kurdish origin as well as with experts on the topic, the aim has been to 
investigate the role of the EU – seen through the conditionality principle, conflict 
resolution and social learning – and what perceived effects a diminishing EU leverage 
may have on individuals of minority background.   
The analysis suggests that the EU is indeed seen as an important factor leading to 
increased recognition and thus identity awareness of the Kurds as a group. Even if the 
sincerity of EU reforms is questioned, the young Kurds display a belief in the EU and 
subsequent frustration by the standstill of EU reforms. The perceived role and 
importance of the EU for the individuals has seemingly shrunk, and the analysis 
further suggests that the increased recognition and subsequent identity awareness is 
leading to the interviewees seeing themselves between a rock and a hard place – 
without the belief of further reforms pushed by neither the Turkish government nor the 
EU. At the same time, polarization, nationalistic tendencies and politicized identities 
continue to grow.   
The conclusion points to the EU’s role in pushing for minority rights reform and 
conflict resolution, seen as valuable for members of minority groups – however 
questions the pressure for reforms without lasting enforcement mechanisms.  
By focusing on the implications of this development for the individual Kurd, the hope 
is to shed light on the development of increased identity awareness and EU pressure or 
lack of such. The qualitative case study is unable to isolate the effects of the EU on 




Chapter 1: Turkey – minority rights and EU accession 
“(T)his is a long-term issue. It’s the social polarization, and the deepening of identity 
politics. (…) They [the Kurdish youth] less and less consider themselves as Turkish. 
They don’t feel the ownership, the belonging. They don’t feel as belonging to the 
Turkish Republic” (Aktar 2012 [interview]).  
 
1.0. Introduction  
One leg in the West, one in the East. The Republic of Turkey is undoubtedly a country 
of growing interest, to Europe as well as the rest of the world. Turkey’s economy, 
unique geo-strategic location and its - sometimes controversial - foreign policy 
choices, are all elements which have made it a country it becomes increasingly 
necessary to take into consideration. The policy of “zero problems with neighbours”, 
its stance in Libya and its criticisms of Israel are all examples of Turkish appearances 
on the stage of regional and global politics. The Turkish initiative to help the 
rebuilding of Somalia is another noteworthy example (Today’s Zaman 2012). Turkish 
public opinion is generally positive when speaking of Turkish enhanced strength in 
their neighborhood. A great majority seems to think that Turkey may serve as a model 
for the Middle East (Seufert 2011: 3). Seeing the political development in later years, 
Turkey has been characterized as a showcase of how one can integrate a “potent 
Islamic movement” into a secular constitutional democratic framework. Well-known 
are Turkey’s wide-reaching reforms, implemented as part of its drive for a full 
European Union membership – and claimed to have led to an improvement of the 
democratic quality in Turkey (Kirisci 2011: 335).  
On the other hand, voices are currently speaking up about a Turkey bitterly divided 
over “…issues of minority and human rights, freedom of speech, and media and 
academic autonomy” (Turam 2012: 109). Opinions on Turkey’s attempts to reach 
European standards recognize that problems are evident, in particular in the realms of 
“fundamental freedoms and democratization” (Tokyay 2012). The Council of Europe’s 
Human Rights Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg has uttered concerns with a 
Turkey “giving precedence to the protection of the state over the protection of human 
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rights” (Economist 2012). Within the past couple of years, more than one hundred 
journalists have been arrested, the majority still awaiting trial. The conflict between 
the Turkish government and the Kurdish insurgence group, the PKK, continues with a 
seemingly endless string of violence. Contradicting official claims that Turkey is 
indeed democratizing, there is a growing concern amongst international commentators 
that the government is in fact moving away from its declared democratic aspirations. 
“Turkey is in many ways moving in a direction which makes it hard to deal with the 
traditional European values of democracy, gender equality and freedom of speech” 
(Messerschmidt 2011). Similarly, “despite Turkey’s rapid modernization, individuals 
continue to be prosecuted on the basis of claiming the rights of the Kurds and other 
minorities and demonstrations are stopped using anti-terrorism laws” (Human Rights 
Watch 2011). Turkey received only 3 points, a negative development, on the Freedom 
House index due to the ban on a pro-Kurdish party by the Constitutional Court. Turkey 
thus remains only a “partly free” society, according to Freedom House (Freedom 
House Country Report 2010 and 2011). 2010 saw Reporters without Borders ranking 
Turkey its lowest score in a decade (Albion 2011: 5). “Despite some notable advances 
in freedom of expression in recent years, the overall trend in Turkey has been 
negative” (Albion 2011: 4). This shows the flip side of the lira.   
 
1.1. “Turkey’s march towards Europe”  
Ever since the 1923 establishment of the Republic, Turkey has identified itself as part 
of, and had close connections to, the rest of Europe - being one of the founding 
members of the Council of Europe and a member of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE 2007: 155; Örmeci 2011). Although obtaining full 
European Union membership has been an uttered goal for Turkish policy makers – 
including the AK Party, which is currently serving its third period in office – actually 
joining the EU has proven far more difficult (Toktas & Aran 2009: 698). Turkey has 
been an associate member of the union and its predecessors since 1963, and filed its 
first formal application for membership in 1987. Turkey achieved candidate status at 
the 1999 Helsinki summit, and in the following years the Turkish government pursued 
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various reform packages in controversial areas such as human rights and freedom of 
expression, aiming at fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, a requirement for EU 
accession (Toktas & Aran 2009: 698; Örmeci 2011; Grigoriadis 2008: 35). The EU 
candidacy was seen as accelerating a democratic reform process in these controversial 
policy areas (Kirisci 2011: 335). The AKP – in power since 2002 – continued the 
reform process. Being aware of the minority rights condition for EU membership, 
Turkey “…embarked on a redefinition of its national interest and identity” 
(Grigoriadis 2008: 35). This became a difficult project for the military and civil 
bureaucracy, who knew that such an approach would deprive the bureaucracy of its 
earlier privileges (Grigoriadis 2008: 35). Still, reform packages were pursued to meet 
the EU criteria, with achievements in particularly the realms of linguistic freedoms and 
broadcasting. The confirmation that other languages than Turkish existed in Turkey, 
was a major breakthrough for EU, and the acceptance of linguistic diversity proved 
important for Muslim minorities (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 463). In 2004, the EU 
decided that Turkey did meet the Copenhagen criteriaand the two parties opened 
accession talks in October 2005 (Kubicek 2005: 361; The Nowegian Helsinki 
Committee 2007: 1). An observer noted that the reforms undertaken by Turkey would 
have been “… impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU 
anchor in the direction of full membership” (Kubicek 2005: 362). Here, one can see 
significant developments in the EU-Turkish relationship. The situation currently, 
however, can hardly be seen as that prosperous.    
 
1.2. Turkey and EU conditionality today  
The issue of Turkish EU membership has been widely debated in the last decade. EU 
conditionality – seen here as entrance criteria to join the EU, was adopted over time 
during the EU’s eastern enlargement (Tocci 2008: 833). For Turkey, to put it simply: 
“EU conditionality on Turkey is much less effective than it used to be” (Somer 2012 
[interview]). The EU can be seen as having lost much of its influence on the 
transformation process in Turkey - with EU’s attempts to warn or interfere not being 
paid sufficient attention to (Aktar 2009). According to the European Policy Centre, the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU is in fact in a deadlock (Paul 2011: 1), a trend 
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which is expected to continue (Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview], Somer 2012 
[interview]). No accession chapter has been opened since June 2010, only one out of 
35 chapters set up for negotiations has been closed, whereas 18 chapters have been 
frozen due to veto from France, Cyprus or the entire European Council (Paul 2011: 1). 
The rush for so-called EU reforms has not lasted, and Turkey can be seen to going 
back to a so-called “restoration period” (Aktar 2009; Aktar 2012 [interview]). Main 
obstacles for Turkish EU accession are the Cyprus issue, public and political opinion 
within the EU and the financial crisis (Economist 2010). Other problems, according to 
the EU itself, include freedom of expression and the rights of the Kurdish minority 
(EU Document). The Turks themselves are increasingly tired of the seemingly never-
ending accession talks, and polls show that numbers favoring Turkish EU membership 
are decreasing (Economist 2010)
1
. Some actors within Turkey are also seen to only 
have paid lip-service to the accession process, wishing to halt the entire process when 
EU accession would come all too close (Tocci 2008: 887).   
A view that the reform process between the EU and Turkey has stopped completely, is 
not shared by everybody. Yilmaz (2011) claims that developments are still happening, 
also in controversial areas such as minority rights. Notably, the EU “remains an 
influential actor in Turkey” (Human Rights Watch 2011). However, the European 
Commission Report in November 2010 stated that recent reforms have been of 
“limited scope” (Human Rights Watch 2011). The chief Turkish EU-negotiator, 
Egemen Bagis, has claimed that the process towards EU membership is more 
important than the results – however, it is hard to persuade the Turks to go through this 
process if they have no belief that they will reach their goal of EU membership 
(Economist 2011). As Aktar (2009) states, “…(a) Turkey not seeing its future in the 
EU membership will have difficulties to (…) absorb the democratic environment 
resulting from the EU-inspired reforms”. Who, now, would have the most to lose by 
such a deterioration of Turkish-EU relations? One group would be the Kurdish 
minority in Turkey – whose restrictions on language, culture and freedom of 
                                                          
1 According to Seufert (2011: 5), some 65% of the Turkish population support the Turkish foreign policy program, a number 
clearly higher than the election results for the ruling AK Party. This underlines the independent popularity of the new foreign 
policy which includes a progressively critical stance towards the European Union. 
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expression were improved due to EU-related reforms (Freedom House Report 2010). 
In order to continue the assessment of minority rights and the Kurds in the Turkish 
context, one needs to identify what definitions of minorities exist, what position the 
protection of minorities have in the international arena and whether and why minority 
rights are really seen as important for EU accession. Has the EU pressure led to large-
scale developments for the Kurds in the realms of minority rights – and what would be 
the impact of a weakening of EU pressure?   
 
1.3. Minority definitions and developments  
Defining who a minority group is, has proved to be a complex issue. The reason for 
this is that no common definition of what constitutes a national minority exists. One 
explanation for the lack of definition is that states are anxious that increased minority 
rights will endanger their territorial integrity (Kugelmann 2007: 237-241). The lack of 
universally recognized frameworks on the rights of minorities is an important 
limitation for the protection and promotion of minority rights. There has, however, 
been a number of attempts to define what a minority is. A much-used and cited 
definition comes from UN’s former Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti 
(Kugelmann 2007: 237). Here, a minority is “a group numerically inferior to the rest 
of the population in a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being 
nationals of the state – posess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing 
from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language” 
(OHCHR 1979)
2
.   
Under international law, states are obliged to as a minimum to avoid that minorities – 
just like any other individual – are being discriminated against. The UN International 
                                                          
2
 As Capotorti did his work for a Sub-Committee of the UN, his definition is intrinsically linked to the only existing 
universally binding text on minority rights protection - the Article 27 of the International Coventant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). The beneficiaries are persons belonging to “ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities” (Kugelmann 2007: 
237). This covenant requires states to protect the human rights of all people living on the territory, without distinction in 
regards to e.g. language (HCNM 2010: 19). The covenant is limited in that it leaves it up to the states themselves to define 
which, or whether they at all have minorities on their territory (Pejic 1997: 669). Still, the mere existence of such a binding 
text has helped preserve minority rights (Kugelmann 2007: 245). 
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
3
 is here the most 
central text, prohibiting states from discriminating between its citizens and thus 
making the convention relevant for persons belonging to minority groups (Pejic 1997: 
675). Particularly for Europe, minorities may also approach the European Court of 
Human Rights to have their rights ensured (Kugelmann 2007: 250).   
 
1.4. Why should minorities be entitled to “special rights”?   
To assess the importance of minority rights, political philosopher Will Kymlicka’s 
liberal theory on minority rights will be used. According to Kymlicka (1995: 2), 
Western political tradition has been remarkably silent on minority issues. After World 
War One, the League of Nations led a new approach when speaking of the recognition 
and protection of minorities (Kugelmann 2007: 235). However, minorities were only 
guaranteed freedom from oppression and discrimination if protected by a “kin state” 
(Kymlicka 1995: 2). After the atrocities of World War Two, a more comprehensive 
approach to minority rights was clearly needed. Liberal forces aimed at providing 
individuals with basic civil and political rights, which would in turn make group rights 
such as minority rights, unnecessary. The assumption was that members of minority 
groups would be protected against prejudice and discrimination, but also that the state 
would be unable to use ethnicity as criteria for distribution of rights (Kymlicka 1995: 
4). Hence, many European societies have developed a so-called “unitary republican 
citizenship”. This implies that all citizens share the same rights – and the unitary 
model dismisses the use of positive actions targeting special groups in the society, 
meaning that minority rights would be substituted with general human rights 
(O’Cinneide 2004: 43-45). According to Kymlicka (1995: 5), however, minority rights 
and human rights cannot be seen as one category, as human rights cannot give an 
answer to basic minority rights’ questions such as recognition of languages, 
educational differences and questions of regional autonomy. Because minority groups 
                                                          
3
 As early as 1966, Article 1(1) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 
1966 should prohibit “(a)ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” 
(Meijknecht 2004: 33). 
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are vulnerable, they may need protection from the majority group when it comes to 
economic and political decisions, areas where the minorities are often unable to 
participate fully (Galenkamp 1995: 43). Similarly, unless groups’ special experiences 
and cultural and social contributions are recognized, these groups are unable to be 
socially equal with the majority (O’Cinneide 2004: 48). This shows the importance of 
recognition of special rights for groups and calls for the recognition of minority and 
group rights, including the right of autonomous self-government in applicable 
situations and extended language rights (O’Cinneide 2004: 48). “Membership in a 
culture is qualitatively different from membership in other associations, since our 
language and culture provide the context within which we make our choices. Loss of 
cultural membership, therefore, is a profound harm that reduces one’s very ability to 
make meaningful choices. Hence special rights compensate for unequal 
circumstances” (Kymlicka 1994: 25).   
Kymlicka is criticized for his “jump” from the existence of a separate societal culture 
(i.e. national minority) to the assumption that its members wish to keep and preserve 
their particular culture (Galenkamp 1996: 45). Importantly, people’s preferences 
change and shift over time. This contradicts the “difference multiculturalism”, where 
one assumes that ethnic minorities have an unchangable identity which needs to be 
preserved. According to Barry (2001: 49), one needs to take into consideration the 
changing attitudes and identities of peoples, also within ethnic minority groups – 
which creates a dynamic, rather than static, environment. Still, “...(t)here is an 
increasing global recognition that minority rights are an essential part of human rights” 
(Rechel 2009: 231). Before moving to the EU and minority rights protection, one 
should look briefly at international organizations’ handling of minority rights, from 
which the EU has adopted its principles (Sasse 2009: 20).   
 
1.5. The OSCE, the Council of Europe and the United Nations  
To demonstrate the organization’s focus on minorities, the OSCE established a High 
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in 1992 (OSCE/HCNM 2010: 1; 
Kugelmann 2007: 249). This High Commissioner should be an instrument for conflict 
prevention, seen in the context of the war in Yugoslavia and the breakup of the Soviet 
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Union. The High Commissioner identifies a minority as “a group with linguistic, 
ethnic, or cultural characteristics distinct from the majority and that usually not only 
seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity” 
(UN Pamphlet No. 9: 5). The HCNM, currently Knut Vollebæk, has stated that within 
certain contexts, the term national minority should refer to all “religious, linguistic and 
cultural as well as ethnic minorities, regardless of whether these groups are recognized 
as such by the States where they reside” (FRA 2011: 18). This again reinforces the 
importance of minority protection as something universal.  
For the Council of Europe, the perhaps most important instrument developed regarding 
minority rights has been the 1995 Framework Convention on National Minorities. This 
was the first legally binding instrument directly connected with the protection of 
minorities (Karimova & Deverell 2001: 4). Two problems persist, however. Firstly, 
the Framework Convention is only legally binding for the 39 Council of Europe 
member states having signed and ratified the convention. Powerful member states such 
as France and Turkey have failed to do so, sending dubious signals to the other states. 
Secondly, as the states were unable to agree on a common definition of what a national 
minority should be, the Framework Convention solely deals with the recognized 
national minorities, which the states themselves are free to decide who are 
(Kugelmann 2007: 254)
4
. These challenges highlight the ambiguous nature of minority 
definitions. Still, the sheer existence of the Framework Convention has contributed to 
setting minority rights on the agenda.   
The United Nations 1992 Declaration on Rights of Persons belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was seen as an important development for 
and acknowledgement of the special protection of minority rights. Article 1(1) of the 
declaration states that “States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, 
cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories 
and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity” (UN Declaration 
Article 1). Still, one is also to remember that this declaration is non-binding and that 
                                                          
4 This has led to different definitions such as Luxembourg claiming they have no national minorities at all, to Sweden listing 
five different groups as their national minorities. For some countries, the words minority does not even exist, such as in 
Macedonia (Council of Europe List of Signatures). 
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the states themselves are free to define what a national minority constitutes in their 
particular context (Kugelmann 2007: 244).   
 
1.6. The EU  
For the EU, the 1992 Treaty on the European Union marked a shift from an 
economical to a more politicized union. For the first time, the 1993 Copenhagen 
criteria noted that recognition of minority rights would be a condition for union 
membership (Grigoriadis 2008: 34; FRA 2011: 19). The EU also promoted standards 
in particular fields related to minorities, namely the right to set up minority 
institutions, the right to use minority languages in front of the courts and the protection 
of refugees and displaced people (FRA 2011: 19). This focus on minority rights 
protection is broadly found in EU documents. Looking at the Article 2 of the Lisbon 
Treaty, EU values are “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities” (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 10; FRA 2011: 3). The emphasis on minorities in 
both the Charter [the Lisbon Treaty] and in the Copenhagen Criteria shows the EU’s 
approach towards minority rights being, at least, increasingly more comprehensive 
(FRA 2011: 24-25). Importantly, “...the EU has played a paramount role among the 
international actors influencing domestic minority rights policies” (Rechel 2009: 10).). 
As seen, minorities are often in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the states in which they 
reside, risking discrimination and lacking protection (FRA 2011: 13). It might be 
natural, then, that when minority rights protection was introduced as a clear 
requirement within the Copenhagen criteria, minorities in accession states hoped for 
increased protection.   
When it comes to EU pressure on Turkey regarding minority rights, annual EU reports 
have repeatedly called for an improvement of the treatment of minorities in Turkey 
(Toktas & Aran 2009: 706). This could be a sign for Turkey’s minorities that the 
European Union would come “to their rescue”. The EU pressure regarding minority 
rights reform became increasingly intense as the process towards EU membership was 
getting closer for Turkey, and “(p)ressure from the side of the EU in fact led to large-
scale reform concerning the recognition of the Kurds” (Kirisci 2011: 336). This 
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reinforces the importance of EU presence for the Kurds and could imply that the Kurds 
would have great faith in the EU, believing that the union could strongly influence 
Turkish minority rights policies.  
  
1.6.1. Criticisms of the EU minority regime  
Just as other international bodies have not come up with a comprehensive and 
common definition, the EU also fails to define what constitutes a minority (FRA 2011: 
9). EU law has nothing to say on the decision as to what groups as seen as national 
minorities – this  being solely up to the member states (FRA 2011: 20). Minority 
protection became a condition for EU membership only after the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Thus, one can argue that double standards exist within the EU regarding minority 
rights, with EU demanding more of candidate countries than the existing member 
states (Yildiz 2011: 7; Sasse 2008: 846-47). This has raised questions as to whether the 
EU is really committed to minority protection (Toktas & Aran 2009: 706). Claims are 
made that “(t)he official minority policy (of the EU) reflects confusion in both 
defining minorities and granting them legal protection” (Yildiz 2011: 30). The 
minority criterion can therefore be seen as neither consistent nor credible from the side 
of the EU, but as a vague approach (Sasse 2008: 843; Toktas & Aran 2009: 706-708; 
Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 9). Still, the minorities themselves may have great faith in the 
leverage of the EU.   
 
1.6.2. “Otherness”  
The above-mentioned EU pressure for recognition of minority groups may have 
unforeseen consequences. Claims that EU pressure has led to new patterns and 
extended recognition of minority groups is an interesting, however little debated aspect 
of EU influence. Such recognition may, however, ultimately lead to the reinforcement 
of the “otherness” of the minority group. This would imply minority groups becoming 
both increasingly recognized and also more exposed to discrimination, as it will trigger 
nationalist reactions (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 20). This may ultimately result in a 
sharper nationalist discourse. According to Kirisci (2011: 335), both Turkish and 
Kurdish people currently experience a growing nationalism – sometimes leading to 
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large-scale protests from the Kurds. As will be further discussed in the following 
chapters, EU pressure on minority rights may challenge the already existing power 
structure between different groups in society and may in fact lead to polarization 
(Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 5-20). Looking at the impact of EU pressure on minority 
rights in Turkey, and its implications for the individual, is at the core of the thesis.  
 
1.7. Research puzzle  
The issue of Europeanization - here seen as the way the EU pressures for domestic 
change in accession countries - is clearly interesting. Claims that without a clear 
guarantee for EU membership - which is presently unheard of - Turkey will be 
unwilling to embark on the road towards comprehensive reforms, show the importance 
of Europeanization or lack of such, in particular when speaking of minority rights 
(Aktar 2009). As a policy area, minority protection can be seen as a topic which “...has 
been largely ignored in the literature on EU accession (…) In the last two decades, the 
protection of minorities has received unprecedented attention. For those countries 
hoping to join the European Union, minority protection has become a key criterion in 
the accession process” (Rechel 2009: 3). Since the introduction of the Copenhagen 
Criteria in 1993, EU accession countries are required to have “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities” (EU 1993). When Turkey became an EU candidate country in 1999, 
space was indeed opened up for advocates of minority rights reform (Kirisci 2011: 
339), with EU pressure leading to a de facto recognition of the Kurdish identity and 
their rights as a minority (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 31). For the Kurds, the perceived 
value of EU membership has been very high (Tocci 2008: 887). The EU pressure and 
leverage, however, can be seen to have waned in the later years together with reform 
stagnation (Aktar 2012 [interview]). What consequences can this development have 
for the members of minority groups? Have the EU pressure for increased minority 
rights led to changes in how the Kurds perceive themselves – contributing to a stronger 
identity? What are potential problems and challenges with EU involvement in this 
regard? This thesis will focus on the people mostly affected by the policies - the 
minorities themselves. Being the largest minority in Turkey and having experienced 
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marginalization in the Turkish society, the Kurds stand out as a natural group to 
investigate. Although I do not propose to prove that EU pressure in all cases leads to 
increased identity awareness amongst minority groups, I do attempt to highlight how 
such a pressure for increased recognition may contribute to and affect identity 
awareness, and whether this may be problematic if enforcement mechanisms for 
continued reforms are weakened or disappear altogether. “The EU leverage. For 
minority rights, or for democratic rights, or for any other modern rights and freedoms, 
doesn’t exist anymore in Turkey. I mean, Europe has nothing to say anymore” (Aktar 
2012 [interview]). This suggests an at best decrease in the EU pressure. The research 
question posed will be:  
 
1.7.1. Research question [1]  
Can EU pressure have contributed to a rise in identity awareness amongst young 
Kurds – and what are possible implications of a decreased EU pressure and an 
increased Kurdish identity awareness?  
 
Investigating what the perceived implications for the individual of the EU pressure and 
identity awareness in the field of minority rights, are thus the core focus of this thesis. 
Interesting is also how the members of minority groups assess their own situation – 
and by looking at their own demands, one can possibly come up with new suggestions 
as to what can be done with the rather complicated situation between Turks and Kurds.
  
1.7.2. Research question [2]   
What are the demands of the young Kurds to improve the current situation?   
 
1.8. Outline of the thesis  
Much has been written on Turkey and the Europeanization of domestic policies, 
however little from the perspectives of the people mostly affected by the laws and 
regulations. By looking at the opinions of people subject to policies, one may possibly 
adopt a new understanding as to the importance, scope and direction of the 
Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey – and, importantly, what effects it has 
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had and is still having. Focusing on the implications for the individual, the hope is to 
be able to say something more general about effects of Europeanization for people 
belonging to minority groups. The results from qualitative interviews with members of 
various Kurdish groups and professors in the field may give interesting answers and 
contribute to further research on the topic.  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one provides the reader with a general 
introduction of the Turkish-EU relations as well as the origins and importance of 
minority rights protection, before identifying the research puzzle. Chapter two deals 
with the background of Turkish republicanism and the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. 
Chapter three continues with an assessment of identity awareness and Europeanization 
theory, with a particular focus on the Europeanization of minority rights. Chapter four 
deals with research methods, and justifies the choice of qualitative method, case study 
and semi-structured interviews as a methodological basis for the thesis. Chapter five is 
comprised of the analysis of interviews pursued with Kurdish trade union members, 
university students, workers and experts on the topic – highlighting their thoughts and 
opinions regarding Europeanization and minority rights and growth of the Kurdish 
identity. The last concluding chapter sums up the findings of the research and suggests 
areas for further research. Before embarking on the more theoretical aspects of 
Europeanization, domestic change and identity awareness, it is necessary to get an 
overview of the background of the Turkish Republic and the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. 
How did the Turkish identity come about – and what caused the Kurds to protest, both 
parties engaging in a violent conflict costing at least 30 000 lives?  
 
Chapter 2: “Turkishness” and “Kurdishness”  
“Yes, we went back to the village in the summers, despite the repressions. But during 
those months, my siblings and I were forced to speak Turkish with relatives, 
neighbours and childhood friends (…) Being unable to speak properly is a reminder of 
how poor a person’s language becomes when it does not get access to its culture” 




2.0. Background  
The vast Kurdish minority in Turkey is used as the point of departure for this thesis. 
There are no official surveys made in Turkey about ethnic affiliation, making 
estimates about the number of individuals belonging to minorities difficult (OSCE 
Report 2007: 20). However, constituting the single largest minority within Turkey by 
far, the Kurds are a vital group. Furthermore, the ongoing Kurdish-related PKK 
insurgency is recognized as Turkey's foremost domestic problem, having resulted in at 
least 30 000 deaths (International Crisis Group 2011: 1). The insurgency and Kurdish 
demands for greater autonomy have underlined the importance of the Kurds’ presence 
in Turkey. How did the conflict come about and where do Turkey’s minority 
approaches come from? One should adopt a general understanding of the history of 
minorities in Turkey and the origins of “Turkishness”.   
 
2.1. The Turkish Republic   
For centuries, the Ottoman Empire was a powerful agent in world politics, however 
due to imperialistic politics and nationalistic freedom movements crumbled and 
ultimately fell. Before collapsing, it had tried to modernize, however with its vast 
polyglot population, domestic troubles and wars the Ottoman Empire proved unable to 
face demands for reforms (Kili 1980: 383). The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 
after the War of Independence
5
. Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk – “Father of all Turks”] 
formed a government from his war-time revolutionary group and ensured the writing 
of the Turkish Constitution in 1924. He was re-elected president of the Republic in 
1927, 1931, and 1935 (Yildiz 2005: 11). Ataturk and his beliefs are generally 
extremely valued and respected in the Turkish society. After the War of Independence, 
Kemalist reforms aimed at bringing Turkey up to level with the more advanced states 
of the world, including the Westernization of the Turkish alphabet and the 1924 
abolition of the caliphate (Yildiz 2005: 13). The reforms were directed at “... 
                                                          
5
 The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic was a transformation of state however not of all the ruling 
powers. This can be seen in the importance of the group the Young Turks, a group of young revolutionaries seeking to restore 
the Ottoman parliament and constitution in the late 19th century and ending up as influential actors in the new state (Zurcher 
2002: 2). Sections of the Ottoman army led the transition and subsequently ended up with large proportions of the power 
share in the newly founded republic (Akcam 2004: 23).   
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strengthening the new central authority, to nation building, to secularization of Turkish 
state and society, to realizing political participation, and to bringing about changes in 
the socioeconomic structure of the country” (Kili 1980: 384). The state would be 
heavily influenced by the military and would look to Europe and the West for ideas 
and inspiration. Ataturk and his followers aimed at creating a centralized, 
homogenous, unified state, where all citizens would pursue a single Turkish identity, 
so-called “Turkishness” (Yildiz 2005: 11). The developments importantly emphasized 
the liberation of the Turkish state from outside interference (Aydin 1999: 70). The 
Kemalist principles, Turkey's “foundation”, have thus shaped Turkey's attitudes 
towards the outside world. By emphasizing the single Turkish identity, the principles 
have also shaped attitudes towards the peoples living within the territory of the 
Turkish Republic.   
 
2.1.1. Minority policies in the Turkish Republic  
Although the breakup of the Ottoman Empire included massive population movements 
and massacres, the peoples within the borders of Turkey still proved diverse 
(Grigoriadis 2008: 31). The Ottoman Empire had been characterized along multi-
ethnic, -religious and -linguistic lines entailing religious rather than ethnic divisions. 
The central power identified itself with the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish tradition (Yegen 
1999: 557; Kirisci 1997: 114). The Ottoman millet system classified peoples in 
categories of Muslims and non-Muslims, ultimately leading to a hierarchy based on 
religion where all Muslims resided on top as “first-class” citizens (Kizilkan-Kisacik 
2010: 13; Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 11; Icduygu & Soner 2006: 448). Christians and 
Jews were permitted to create self-governing communities. Still, non-Muslims were 
widely discriminated (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 14; Icduygu & Soner 2006: 452). All 
Muslims in the Empire were totalized under one category, where Muslims falling 
outside the majority Sunni tradition failed to gain recognition and autonomy-like rights 
for their distinctions. The system was not what one would refer to as a minority policy 
today, but more of an instrument to govern “the Other” (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 448-
450). The Ottoman leadership ultimately tried to create an Ottoman “nation” by 
developing a more egalitarian citizenship category. These attempts, referred to as 
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Tanzimat, emphasized political, civil and legal equality. However, the approach failed 
and the non-Muslim minorities grew national identities rather than an Ottoman 
identity. In the following Turkish context, minority rights became linked to ethnic 
dismemberment rather than freedom and equality (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 451).  
To see how the minority rights regime of the Turkish Republic was founded, one must 
look at the framework for minority protection still in use by the Turkish authorities: 
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty, which superseded the 1920 Sevres Treaty 
and established the borders of Turkey (Yildiz 2005: 7), proposed a very narrow 
definition of “minorities” (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 12; OSCE Report 2007: 19). The 
name “Turk” was indented to overcome ethno-cultural differences and create non-
discrimination in the Turkish state, creating a single-non-ethnic Turkish national 
identity (Yildiz 2005: 11). The new republic strongly promoted the universal 
citizenship aspect, seeking to overcome the dualism of the Ottoman Empire's first and 
second class citizens (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 453-454), without granting special 
group rights (Kymlicka 1995: 4). Two shortcomings hindered the full implementation 
of this “universal citizenship” concept. Firstly, the non-Muslim minorities were not 
regarded as “Turks” (Icduygu  & Soner 2006: 455). The Lausanne Treaty recognizes 
specific group rights to some of the non-Muslim groups – namely Greeks, Armenians 
and Jews (Kaya 2011: 202). These groups were permitted to use their own language 
and to establish their own educational, social and religious institutions. The Turkish 
leaders ensured that the non-Muslim minorities’ rights would be upheld – but only as 
long as they did not work against one of Ataturk's most important mantras: the unity of 
the country. Non-Muslim minorities were still looked upon with suspicion as foreign 
elements in the new Turkish state. The second limitation of the Lausanne Treaty was 
that Muslim minorities were not freely allowed to express their distinct characteristics 
(Icduygu & Soner 2006: 454-455). The Lausanne Treaty – as in the Ottoman Empire - 
uses religion as a denominator. This implies that large Muslim minority groups are not 
recognized as minorities, including groups such as Kurds, Alevis and Laz (Kizilkan-
Kisacik 2010: 12). This reality still exists, meaning that Muslim groups with another 
cultural, ethnic or linguistic background are not officially recognized as minorities 
under Turkish law (OSCE Report 2007: 19). The Ottoman Millet system has in fact 
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been reproduced with regards to the Muslim minorities of Turkey, superseding the 
ethno-lingual and sectarian Muslim differences. The Muslim-inclusive notion of 
nationality in theory guaranteed non-discrimination but also denied the free expression 
of other ethno-cultural distinctions than the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish. These concepts 
were reinforced even more after repeated Kurdish rebellions, such as the 1925 Sheikh 
Sahid rebellion, leading to harsh responses and a more insisting focus on 
“Turkishness” (Aytar & Cavdar 2010: 7). In time, as Icduygu and Soner (2006: 455) 
notes, “... the legal-political connotation of “Turk” emerged as a political project in 
which other (Turkish-Muslim) identities were to be amalgamated”. Now, the Turkish 
attempt to create one “national identity” within a state is in history nothing new6. 
Turkey is often compared with France when it comes to seeking to create a national, 
homogenous identity. However, the French consolidation of a non-ethnic and non-
religious liberal democracy occurred after a popular revolution and centuries of 
democratization and secularization. The attempt to do the same in Turkey, with a far 
shorter time span and with the existence of very large minority groups such as the 
Kurds, has proven to be extremely difficult (Smooha 2002: 429). The so-called 
Kurdish issue is closely linked to identity, Kemalism, fears of disintegration and the 
strife for a strong and homogenous Turkish state. The Kurdish issue has been the most 
acute domestic problem in Turkey for decades, causing severe grief and suffering in 
Turkey with seemingly never-ending strings of violence – and the mere existence of 
Kurds has at times been a synonym for separatism (Yildiz 2005: 13). To investigate 
the Kurdish issue in relation to minority rights, one needs to look at the background of 
the Kurdish issue and Kurdish claims.   
 
2.2. The Kurds  
One group which had a lot to lose from Ataturk's vision of the homogenous nation-
state was the largest non-Turkish people of Turkey, the Kurds. The Kurds are a tribal 
people originating from Northwestern Iran, believed to be the single largest group of 
people in the world without a state of their own (Yildiz 2005: 4). The Kurds have 
                                                          
6
 One might recall Massimo D’Azeglio observing “[w]e have made Italy, now we must make Italians” (Byman: 154). 
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throughout their history been a widely distributed group without being the dominant or 
largest group in any state. Still, significant groups of Kurds live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and Azerbadijan. Although an independent Kurdish state has never existed, 
many Kurds have strived for the founding of “Kurdistan” - an area covering parts of 
all the above-mentioned states (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 18)
7
. Since the founding of 
the Turkish Republic, Kurds were subjects to policies of assimilation and so-called 
“Turkification” (Yildiz 2005: 14). 
 
2.2.1. Assimilation and the rise of Kurdish nationalism  
Subsequent Turkish governments have, as seen, excluded non-Muslim minorities and 
failed to recognize the independent existence of Muslim minorities. Instead, a much 
used strategy has been one of assimilation (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 457). Assimilation 
can be seen as a “process whereby individuals or groups of differing ethnic heritage 
are absorbed into the dominant culture of a society” (Encyclopedia Britannica). In 
Turkey, all Muslims were expected to blend in with the overarching Turkish identity 
and swiftly be incorporated into the Turkish society (Arat 2007: 280). One visible 
example of assimilation policies and a much-used strategy to undermine the visibility 
of the Kurdish identity was “re-naming”. Here, street names, village names and family 
names in Kurdish were given new, Turkish names (O'Neill 2004: 77). The Kurds were 
the primary target of this policy of “Turkification” (Yildiz 2005: 14). Arguably, 
Bosnians, Circassians and a limited number of Kurds assimilated into the new identity 
of the republic. Other groups – including a vast number of Kurds – vigorously resisted 
such assimilation attempts (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 13). When protests arose, 
measures to forcefully assimilate these groups were put in place. Resistance from 
Kurds led to more persistent measures from the government – creating a vicious cycle. 
A number of uprisings ultimately followed in the young state from 1925, showing the 
discontent with the new regime (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 114; Grigoriadis 2008: 31). 
                                                          
7
 To justify their claims of an independent state, some Kurds look back to the Sevres Treaty of 1920. This treaty envisaged 
independence for certain minorities in the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds, and should formalize the division of the 
Ottoman Empire. The treaty was never ratified, due to resistance from the Ottoman elite and fears in Europe about the growth 
of the Soviet Union, combined with British reluctance about the ability to find a “suitable” Kurdish leader (Kirisci 1997: 70, 
Yildiz 2005: 7). 
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Many Kurds protested against the very foundations on which the new Turkish 
Republic were formed – seen in a discourse of a western, central, national and secular 
state. Secularization efforts had culminated in the removal of the caliphate in 1924, 
this was difficult to accept for many Kurds (Yegen 1999: 559). The Kurdish 
movement became a symbolic representation of the “old order” of the past, an order 
which had been abolished by the new ruling parties, and Kurdish uprisings became 
blended with a religious identity and depicted as old-fashioned and linked to economic 
backwardness and tribalism (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 457; Yegen 1999: 561).   
 
2.3. The PKK and governmental approaches  
Following decades of armed struggle and Kurdish rebellions, Kurdish nationalism 
became connected to Marxist-leninism in the 1960s. Kurdish separatist groups grew in 
number during the 1970s, the most important being the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan 
[PKK], founded in 1978. The PKK became the most ferocious protester against the 
Turkish state. After fleeing Turkey in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan and the rest of the PKK leadership opened training camps in Syria to 
prepare for future terrorist attacks (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 127). The first PKK 
attacks were launched in 1984, and led to a string of violence and counter-violence 
between the PKK and the governmental forces. Ultimately, this development resulted 
in the strengthening of a Kurdish national awareness (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 112).  
Democratization trends had in the 1950s reduced minority repression to some degree. 
The political radicalization of the 1970s and the military coup of 1980, however, 
strongly affected and limited minority rights (Grigoriadis 2008: 31). Once more, 
forced assimilation was implemented together with the denial of the existence of other 
groups than the Lausanne-recognized minorities. Kurds were claimed to be “Mountain 
Turks”. The constitutions of 1961 and 1982 both strongly emphasized the “unity of the 
Turkish state”. This unity led to conditioning of other rights and freedoms expressed in 
the constitutions, such as the freedom of religion, thought and press (Icduygu & Soner 
2006: 456). Even if the 1982 constitution on the surface promoted individual 
freedoms, the numerous conditions limiting the rights of Turkey's minorities were 
striking (Arat 2007: 6). It reinforced severe restrictions on the Kurds and paved way 
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for a civil state of emergency in Turkey's south-eastern provinces from 1987 onwards. 
The Decree 285 in 1987 granted the Governor General the ability to evacuate villages, 
leading to 3500 villages and three million people being displaced, the vast majority 
being Kurds (Yildiz 2005: 18). This again led to horrendous human rights abuses in 
the area. A campaign lasting from 1984 to 1999 sought to disperse Kurdish 
communities (Yildiz 2005: 10-16)
8
. The Kurdish language was banned, and making 
statements concerning the recognition of the Kurds was also deemed illegal (Kirisci & 
Winrow 1997: 112). These developments were met with Kurdish resistance – 
intensifying the armed struggle (Grigoriadis 2008: 31-32)
9
. Throughout the 1990s the 
minority situation for the Kurds in Turkey was dire – recognition of minority rights 
was seen as “surrender to a PKK agenda” and linked to a disintegration of the Turkish 
state. Minorities were categorized as second-class citizens and as collaborators with 
foreign interests seeking the partition of the state. The fear of both military and PKK 
attacks mixed with people displaced forcefully through governmental programs, led 
many villagers to move to a highly uncertain future in Turkey's urban centres. This 
again led to an increase of socio-economic problems in the bigger cities and a higher 
risk of social tension (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 25; Grigoriadis 2008: 31-34). After 
1990, one could notice a liberalizing of certain policies, speeding up after 1999 due to 
the EU accession process and the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. The 
government granted limited linguistic rights to the Kurds, such as broadcasting in 
Kurdish (Updegraff 2012: 123). Attacks from the PKK, however, continued.  
The PKK has had a hard-line strategy in order to create an armed movement, such as 
securing grass-root support by indoctrination. However, Zeynep Gambetti (2009: 54) 
claims that the PKK movement has also released several “pacific forces” which are no 
longer under the direct control of the PKK. Thus, one cannot give the PKK the sole 
                                                          
8 This included the infamous village guards, locally recruited villagers founded by the state to counter the PKK. A number of 
villagers found themselves in a very difficult situation – facing either repressions from the PKK for cooperation with the 
government or repressions from the government for refusing (Yildiz 2005: 17).  
9 According to Kirisci and Winrow (1997: 132), the main goals for the Turkish government from the 1980s onwards have 
been to halt the violence, maintain the well-functioning relations with Western powers and other neighbouring states and at 
the same time keeping economic costs at a minimum. To reach these goals, reforms have been pursued, such as the South-
East Anatolia Development Project (GAP), aimed at improving the economy in the heavily Kurdish-populated areas of 
Turkey's south and south-east (Kirisci & Winrow 1997: 25). 
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responsibility for having turned the Kurdish struggle into a movement. Firstly, she 
argues that the process leading to increased legitimacy for Kurdish political parties, in 
the above-mentioned process particularly growing from 1999 onwards, has led the 
Kurdish parties and the PKK agendas overlapping less and less - seen in the victories 
of Kurdish politicians not advocating the traditional PKK agenda. Also, the bonds tied 
between Kurdish political leaders and Turkish intellectuals and academics have in fact 
contributed to a weakening of the PKK agenda and a strengthening of peace and 
reconciliation efforts. According to Updegraff (2012:120), less than one tenth of the 
Turkish Kurds support the PKK’s original secessionist agenda. The support of Kurdish 
people is vital for PKK’s survival, and for instance the decision to release the 
kidnapped CHP-representative Hüseyin Aygün can be seen as a signal that the PKK 
would be sensitive to the wishes of the Kurdish people. Can one change the 
perceptions of the Kurds, Ihsan Yilmaz (2012) claims that it is possible also to change 
the actions of groups such as the PKK.   
 
2.4. Kurdish identity and “demands”  
Importantly, one single identity shared by all Kurdish people does not exist. “Now, if 
tomorrow there would be an attempt to come to a modus vivendi with the Kurds, there 
would be great disagreement between those who are established and living here and 
the others’ “over there”” (Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview]). This suggests that, 
naturally, one set of demands to solve the current conflict is not shared by all Kurds. 
However, the afore-mentioned assimilation attempts from the Turkish government 
aiming to create a sense of “Turkishness” have led to fierce responses from many 
Kurds, strongly advocating their right to express their own identity (Updegraff  2012: 
122). Three areas of demands widely believed to be crucial for many Kurds are 
linguistic, cultural and political demands.  
 
2.4.1 Linguistic demands  
“Language is the biggest Kurdish demand because language equals identity” 
(Kimmelmann 2011). The Kurdish language has been a thorn in the side of the 
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relationship between the Kurds and Turkish governments
10
, with Turkish governments 
having repeatedly banned the use of Kurdish both in private and in public life. 
“Subsequent Turkish governments have proved particularly sensitive to the use of the 
Kurdish language, and thus have used varying prohibitions on Kurdish as a means to 
subdue the Kurds” (O'Neil 2004: 73). The Turkish language has been seen as the core 
of “Turkishness”, Turkish national feeling and citizenship. Its importance can be seen 
in for example the “Citizen! Speak Turkish!” campaign of the 1950s (Icduygu & Soner 
2006: 459). Also today, the debate on the use of Kurdish is heated. Some claim that 
the government is acting hypocritical when they allow a limited use of Kurdish – using 
Prime Minister Erdogan speaking some Kurdish words as an example - while at the 
same time individuals find themselves in danger if speaking Kurdish (Hayatsever 
2012).   
 
2.4.2. Cultural demands  
Claims from minority groups may span from independent statehood to joining another 
state, or aspects regarded as “internal self-determination”, where groups claim 
territorial or cultural autonomy (Wolff 2011: 2). For the majority of Kurds in Turkey, 
the latter two may be seen as the most viable – and in particular the prospect of 
cultural autonomy, as there has been a shift from separatism to an increased focus on 
increased linguistic, cultural and political rights for the Kurds (Tocci 2008: 878). 
Similarly, “Kurds became more willing to reconsider their secessionist aims only in 
the context of Turkey’s accession process, which promised the extension of rights and 
freedoms in Turkey” (Tocci 2008: 886). Indeed, the EU accession process before 2005 
did see improvements in the field of cultural expression for the Kurds. Rights of the 
Kurdish language, culture, education and broadcasting were elements improved by the 
accession process (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2007: 1). However, after 2006 
investigators identify a worrisome development, concluding in 2007 that “there are 
still serious shortcomings related to (…) implementing cultural and linguistic rights for 
Kurds and other minorities” (The Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2007: 2). One 
                                                          
10 Although the Kurds do not have one common language, the most spoken Kurdish dialects are usually mutually 
understandable (Yildiz 2005: 4). 
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visible example of cultural expressions is the celebration of Newroz. This “feast of 
spring” was celebrated only by the Kurds in Turkey and was banned altogether by the 
Turkish governments until the 1990s (Akyol 2012). From 1995 onwards, however, the 
feast was officially adopted, and Turks, as according to the Newroz tradition, also 
started jumping over fires. The 2012 celebration proved to be problematic, however, as 
the pro-Kurdish BDP party wanted to celebrate it on a Sunday rather than on March 
21
st
, the traditional date for Newroz. This resulted in arguments and clashes between 
the police and BDP supporters, demonstrating that cultural issues are very much on the 
agenda (Aykol 2012).  
 
2.4.3. Political demands  
A core Kurdish demand concerns the continuation of the 10% electoral threshold, the 
highest in any Council of Europe country. This has remained after the June 2011 
elections, although criticized by international organizations and the Turkish civil 
society (EU Report 2011: 8). The system has particularly disadvantaged pro-Kurdish 
politicians, who have tried to overcome the obstacle by running in elections as 
“independent candidates” before uniting as a parliamentary group after the elections. It 
is problematic, however, as the independent candidates fail to receive regular funding 
from the state budget (Albion 2011: 3). In April 2011, Turkey's senior electoral body 
dismissed 12 candidates prior to the general elections. Seven of the candidates 
originated from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, the BDP. The electoral 
body claimed that these particular candidates were legally unfit to participate in the 
upcoming general elections (Arsu 2011). Another issue is the closures of Kurdish 
parties. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (the DTP) was banned in 
December 2009, being the fifth pro-Kurdish party closed by the courts in the last 15 
years (Albion 2011: 4). The DTP continues today under another name, the Peace and 
Democracy Party, the BDP. The BDP demands greater autonomy from the state 
(Updegraff 2012: 120). When it comes to the EU, it is seen to have had an impact also 
on the political developments in Turkey. “The direct involvement of the EU became 
critical in terms of Turkey's democratization in general” (Kirisci 2011: 337). The EU 
has repeatedly highlighted the importance of bringing the Turkish judicial system up to 
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line with the standards of the international community (EU Report 2011: 6). The 
Turkish Constitution’s Article 301 – “insulting the Turkish nation” and the Anti-
Terrorism laws have provided major obstacles to the Kurds’ freedom of expression. 
Under the wide and vague Anti-Terrorism laws, discussing Kurdish rights of self-
determination and interviewing former PKK leaders have been causes for prosecution 
(Albion 2011: 5). The width of the term “terrorism” worries international 
organizations, and arrests show the need for amending Turkey’s anti-terror legislation 
(The Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2007: 6). Now, are the Kurdish demands and the 
Turkish refusal to grant them such rights something special? To assess the legitimacy 
of the Kurdish claims, one should turn to other states with somehow similar 
experiences.  
 
2.5. Comparing governmental tactics against separatism  
From its outset, the PKK has had a violent agenda, claiming that the only way to avoid 
repressions of Kurdish people was to establish a Kurdish nation-state. To reach this 
goal, all means would be used (Gambetti 2009: 55). The extremely challenging 
situation with separatist minorities makes it natural to compare Turkey’s minority 
approaches to other states which have experienced insurgencies from minorities on 
their territory. How do governments deal with minority rights when faced with violent 
separatist rebellions? Turkey, Spain and the United Kingdom are all NATO members 
with unwanted experiences of violent separatist movements on their territories (Özlen 
2009: 170). Prime Minister Erdogan has called out and compared the PKK insurgency 
to the Basque separatist movement, which has been a common feature among 
commentators (Yetkin 2011). Similarly to the PKK, both ETA and IRA have sought 
independence from the state where they have resided. The types of separatist activity 
in these instances have been ethno-nationalist and separatist groups, motivated by 
nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion (Transnational Terrorism 2008: 107).  Despite 
their differences, the BDP, the largest Kurdish political party, Sinn Fein, the Irish 
Republican Party in Northern Ireland, and Sortu, the political wing of the banned 
Basque Herri Batasuna, have all been said to have connections with the organizations 
of PKK, IRA and ETA, respectively. These connections have been criticized by the 
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EU (CORI 2011: 2-3). In 2011 the three political parties met to discuss how they in the 
best way possible could work with national governments, claiming that drawing on 
their common experiences would foster further peace and reconciliation (Bowcott 
2011). In all three instances, discussions on territorial arrangements have been on the 
political agenda. Whether territorial arrangements - granting divided communities 
local autonomy - is fruitful for conflict prevention, has been a source of disagreement 
between scholars. Claims are made that territorial arrangements in fact induce conflict, 
whereas other scholars are of the opinion that territorial settlements are necessary for 
conflict resolution (Wolff 2011: 2). What is clear, however, when granting internal 
self-determination for groups one should make sure that they participate in decision-
making processes (Wolff 2011: 9). The so-called carrot and stick-approach can be 
used to assess how governments deal with separatist organizations on their territories. 
“Carrots” are soft-line measures, such as negotiations and implementing the separatists 
into the political framework. “Sticks” on the other hand, are forceful elements such as 
repressions and police violence (Transnational Terrorism 2008: 112). Drawing from 
their past experiences, what approaches have been pursued by the British, Spanish and 
Turkish governments, and to what extent have they been successful?   
 
2.5.1. Spanish state strategies  
The ETA movement grew out of and was strengthened due to repression tactics by the 
Franco regime. From the beginning, the Spanish strategy was to deny the conflict 
(Aiarta & Zabalo 2010: 9). A state of emergency was declared in 1968, leading to a 
vicious circle of violence and repressions (Minority Rights Group International 2008; 
Transnational Terrorism 2008: 118). After Franco’s death, strategies changed, and the 
Basque region was given autonomy. Still, approaches pursued after the 1978 
constitutional law were not sufficient to avoid terrorism activity, as the Basques had 
not been part of forming the constitution and thus felt it had no legitimacy (Özlen 
2009: 179 - 180). Additional problems included lack of investigations of past atrocities 
and no effective reconciliation processes (Aiartza & Zabalo 2010: 21). Still, the 
granting of autonomy for the Basque Region together with 16 other regions of Spain 
was important. Today, Basque is a compulsory subject in certain regions and the 
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language is continuing to grow (Minority Rights Group International)
11
. Through 
accommodation approaches – a method of conflict resolution which includes 
recognition and peaceful coexistence of different groups - the Spanish government has 
granted the Basques larger self-government (Updegraff 2012: 126). A permanent 
ceasefire between ETA and the Spanish government was declared in 2011. After 
ETA’s political party Herri Batsuna was banned, its new political wing, Sortu, was to 
participate in elections (Guardian 2011; ECHR). The Spanish also pursued 
negotiations with the insurgents. These “carrot approaches” may have proven to be 
fruitful, as the ETA leadership today is considerably weakened (Özlen 2009: 182). 
 
2.5.2. UK state strategies  
The UK has a long history of combating uprisings from Irish nationalists, a conflict 
which increasingly developed along religious lines between Protestants and Catholics 
(Transnational Terrorism 2008: 110). The general attitude from the government was to 
ignore the situation. This ended when people took to the streets in the 1960s, 
eventually leading to the introduction of direct rule from Westminster in 1971 
(Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse 2003: 89). The IRA pursued from 1980s onwards a 
“bullet and ballot” strategy, meaning that violent activities were carried out while at 
the same time IRA’s political wing Sinn Fein participated in local elections 
(Transnational Terrorism 2008: 111). Today, IRA has given up their weapons and Sinn 
Fein is part of the power sharing executive in Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein claims that 
there is no armed IRA anymore (BBC 2012). Suggested reasons for the relief of 
violence in Northern Ireland have been war-weariness due to a military stalemate, shift 
in British-Irish relations, economic influence of the EU and secret talks between the 
government and the IRA (Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse 2003: 90). There has been a 
combination of demilitarization and the success of Sinn Fein as a political alternative 
(Transnational Terrorism 2008: 112). Seeing that Sinn Fein participated in peace 
processes between the British government and the IRA, the importance of a political 
                                                          
11 The Spanish government has also had regional arrangements with the French, who to a lesser extent have had problems 
with ETA on their territory, cooperating to combat separatist activities in the Basque region (Transnational Terrorism 2008: 
120; Aiarta & Zabalo 2010: 24). 
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rather than a military solution and negotiations as a successful “carrot” approach is 
seen (Transnational Terrorism 2008: 112).   
 
2.5.3. Turkish state strategies  
When it comes to Turkey, the DTP - the only Kurdish party represented in parliament - 
was closed down in 2009 after allegations of connections with the PKK (CORI 2011: 
1; Kirisci 2011: 336). The DTP’s successor, the BDP, has denounced any connections 
between the BDP and the PKK (CORI 2011: 3). Claims are however made that the 
BDP and the PKK have close ties, and that the BDP sees itself as the equivalent to 
Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland (Barkey 2010). Although the BDP claims to have no 
separatist agenda, issues between the government and the BDP over PKK cooperation 
allegations have persisted (CORI 2011: 3-4). There have been problems with 
politicians allegedly supporting the PKK, such as the Kurdish MP Leyla Zana who 
was sentenced to 10 years in prison for “spreading militant propaganda” (Reuters 
2012). According to Human Rights Watch (2012), individuals are convicted for 
“support to the PKK” for non-violent speeches and writings. The Turkish state has 
repeatedly denied any communication with the PKK. Still, tapes leaked to the press in 
2011 indicated that secret talks between the PKK and the Turkish state had in fact 
taken place – indicating that Turkey is using a similar approach as the Spanish and 
British governments (Sunday Zaman 2011; Hurriyet Daily News 2011).  
 
2.5.4. Comparing governmental approaches  
Indeed, similarities between the Basque, the Northern Irish and the Kurdish “issues” 
exist. PKK, IRA and ETA were formed with a separation from the state in mind 
(Özlen 2009: 187). The separatist movements have all experienced policies of denial 
from the states in which they reside as well as periods of emergency rule. Where the 
British government has tried to deal with the threat of separatist activities mostly by 
legal developments seeking to limit the powers of the IRA, the Turkish and the 
Spanish states chose rather to use special and security forces to deal with separatist 
activities, such as Spanish task forces comparable with the Turkish Village Guard 
system (Özlen 2009: 180-189). In both the Spanish and the British cases, talks 
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between the separatists and the state have been successful, where the separatists’ 
political wings have ultimately participated in the states’ power sharing structures. 
This has not yet happened in Turkey, however signs show that the environment for 
negotiations is changing also in Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News 2011). On the other 
hand, the devolution in Britain and the regional autonomy in Spain can be seen as 
contributing to the improvement of the situation in the two EU member states. 
According to the EU, little progress in devolution of power to local administration has 
been made in Turkey, meaning that local municipalities are still heavily dependent on 
central support (EU Report 2011: 10). Furthermore, it can be said that both the IRA 
and the ETA have enjoyed large regional popular support, which has not been the case 
with the PKK (Palabeyik 2011). To sum up, one can see that all three governments 
started out with an extended use of “sticks” – tough measures – towards its 
secessionist movements. The British and Spanish have granted the areas more local 
autonomy, in addition to pursuing negotiations with the separatist groups. On the other 
hand, the Turkish government can be seen as having pursued a military strategy 
against the PKK since 2009 - ultimately also affecting Kurds without PKK affiliations 
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). The Turkish authorities thus still 
has a long way to go before local autonomy and open talks are realities. This leaves 
the question: how does the Turkish government deal with the issue of the Kurds today? 
  
2.6. Recent Turkish developments  
As seen in the introduction chapter, Turkey has undergone large changes within the 
past decades. Some argue that Turkey moves in a more democratic direction, trying to 
come to terms with its legacies and become a modern, democratic nation-state in 
accordance with Western standards. One reason for such a development is the “... clear 
and compulsory demand by the EU for political and economic structural reform” 
(Akcam 2004: 2). This has resulted in a number of reforms putting pressure on Turkey, 
such as political conditions on IMF and World Bank grants. When it comes to dealing 
with the Kurds, the government introduced a large-scale reform in 2009, named the 
“Democratic Opening”, which should improve the relations with the Kurdish 
population (Ulusoy 2011). This AKP reform was seen as a promising step, however 
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the effects of the initiated project have waned (Albion 2011: 2; Human Rights Watch 
2012). In the aftermath of the Democratic Opening, it is argued that the government 
has replaced the extension of minority rights with a much more critical approach, even 
going as far as banning and jailing people advocating such rights (Sinclair-Webb 
2011). Currently, violence in Turkey's southeastern provinces continues combined 
with polarization in bigger cities throughout the country. According to Human Rights 
Watch, Turkey’s government has failed to prioritize human rights after 2005, and 
freedom of expression has suffered (Human Rights Watch 2012). This might be 
connected to the EU-Turkey deadlock (Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview]). Three specific 
cases can be pointed out to highlight the challenges that Turkey is facing, 
demonstrating that the Kurdish issue is on the very top of the agenda for the Turkish 
policy makers: the KCK investigations, the Ergenekon case and the Fetullah Gulen 
movement.   
The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) is allegedly a PKK-founded umbrella 
organization for its supporters, and has been looked upon as the “urban wing” of the 
PKK. The infamous KCK investigation started in 2009 and has resulted in the 
detainment of hundreds of Kurdish politicians and other people who are accused of 
being affiliated with the PKK (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). The 
accused are suspected of various crimes, such as membership in a terrorist 
organization or trying to destroy the integrity of the nation. The KCK investigation has 
especially hit members of the BDP party, which has led to the BDP accusing the 
government of suppressing  BDP officials (Today's Zaman 2012).   
The Ergenekon case also contributes to the somehow complex nature of Turkish 
politics. This alleged clandestine ultra-nationalist network planning to overthrow the 
government is said to consist of people from various backgrounds, from the military to 
the police force and civil society. The Ergenekon network is claimed to be a successor 
of the so-called “deep state” in Turkey, which consisted of groups seeking political 
influence by manipulation and even assassinations. More than 300 individuals are 
awaiting trial in the case and hundreds of military officers have been arrested (Licursi 
2012; Albion 2011: 2).   
The imam Gulen movement has been connected to the Ergenekon case, demonstrating 
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the intertwined elements of Turkish politics. Fetullah Gulen, currently residing in the 
US, is seen as one of Turkey's most powerful political forces. The secretive nature of 
the movement and the rumours about a power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen 
himself has brought the Gulen movement on the agenda in Turkey. Critics claim that 
the movement aims at spreading the role of Islam in Turkey making the country more 
conservative – with the alleged connections to the Ergenekon trials and the police 
force shedding doubts about the full independence of Turkish bureaucracy (Bilefsky & 
Arsu 2012).   
One can see that “(t)he non-resolution of the Kurdish issue remains the single greatest 
obstacle to progress on human rights in Turkey” (Human Rights Watch 2012). The 
same report notes that little progress regarding Turkish EU membership is made.   
 
2.7. Minority rights and Europeanization  
The issue of minority rights has been an important source of disagreement in the 
negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Turkey's minority regime is not in line with 
international standards and has been subject to a large number of convictions in the 
European Court of Human Rights. In theory, the rights of all citizens are protected 
under the universal framework prohibiting discrimination. In reality, Turkey has 
pursued repression and assimilation policies towards its minorities (Albion 2011: 8). 
The EU has put pressure on Turkey to recognize the particularities of minorities within 
its territory. By responding to the EU pressure, Turkey was seen to be heading towards 
an adequate system of minority protection, as laid out by the Council of Europe, OSCE 
and the EU (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 462). When Turkish EU membership did seem 
like a viable option, Turkish governments pursued reform packages aiming at 
improving minority rights. The Turkish EU accession process “attributed greater 
significance to the protection and promotion of cultural, linguistic and religious 
distinctions of minority peoples” (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 461). So far so good. 
However, as a New York Times report argues, “...(h)uman rights advocates say that 
without the viable prospect of European Union membership to motivate restraint, the 
Turkish government’s authoritarian streak is growing unchecked” (Bilefsky 2011). In 
Turkey, “…evidence suggests that it is the prospect of [EU] membership that acts as a 
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real catalyst to spur political change” (Kubicek 2005: 364).  Seeing that, in Turkey, the 
revision of minority rights began as a part of Turkey’s goal of EU accession 
(Grigoriadis 2008: 24, own emphasis), this would suggest that if the prospect of 
membership is no longer there, political change will not be seen – having 
consequences for policy areas such as minority rights. It becomes natural to look at the 
theory assessing the impact of the EU; Europeanization theory. According to Ulusoy 
(2009: 376), the “… pressure on Turkey to Europeanize is greater than ever and is now 
defined as adapting to European norms and governance structures that challenge the 
centrality of the nation-state and creating (sic) an institutional basis permitting ethnic 
and religious groups to make their political demands”. This naturally points at the 
concept of minority rights. By looking at Europeanization theory, assessing the impact 
of EU pressure on minority rights will be possible.   
 
Ch 3. Theory: Identity growth and Europeanization  
3.0. Combining EU pressure and identity  
Knowing that the focus will be on EU pressure and identity, and after looking at 
Turkey’s minority rights’ regime and long road towards EU accession, combining 
these elements and theorizing relevant concepts becomes a natural next step. 
Arguably, during times when Turkey saw EU membership as viable, they 
implemented significant reforms granting extended rights for the Kurds - even if the 
actual implementation proved to be slow. This degree of acceptance of the Kurds as an 
ethnic category was new in Turkey (Somer 2008: 229). Recent developments suggest 
that EU membership is no longer seen as an immediate viable option in Turkey, 
(Economist 2012; Aktar 2012 [interview]). Seeing that the visibility of the Kurds 
could be used to in fact exclude the group “if Turkey’s integration process with the EU 
came to a halt” (Somer 2005: 619), what has happened to the Kurdish identity and 
self-awareness? What effects will the weakened prospect of membership have on the 
situation for Turkey’s minorities? The questions posed are attempts to highlight the 
potential effects of EU involvement and problematize these effects, focusing on the 
implications for the individual – here focusing on young Kurds allegedly experiencing 
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a more prominent ethnic identity (Aktar 2012 [interview]). One needs to look at the 
categories of ethnic identity and identity growth as well as theorize EU pressure 
through Europeanization theory – starting with a constructivist approach.  
  
3.1. Constructivism and identity  
Constructivism as a theoretical approach has been increasingly used on studies of the 
EU. According to Checkel, the constructivist turn in studies on the European Union 
now include factors such as norms and culture (Checkel 2001: 195). This implies 
giving larger importance to so-called “ideational factors”, typical for constructivism, 
including speeches and identity (Karakoc 2010: 920). The concept of identity has been 
increasingly debated in the past decades, and has been paid most attention to by 
constructivist scholars (Legro 2009: 38; Chandra & Laitin 2002: 2). In the case of 
Turkey, the mere revision of minority rights began as a part of Turkey’s goal of EU 
accession and was based on a constructivist reasoning. This corresponds to the strong 
normative character of Europeanization and EU pressures, seeking to bring about 
ideological shifts across borders (Grigoriadis 2008: 24). As this approach deals with 
states as actors, a fruitful alternative will be the “rule-oriented constructivist 
approach”, introduced by Nicholas Onuf. This approach, importantly, makes ethnic 
identities actors in the game (Karakoc 2010: 920). It is the ethnic identities’ role within 
the domestic structure which will be discussed in this thesis – which makes the rule-
oriented constructivism a good starting point.      
 
3.2. Identity change and growth of ethnic identity   
Why this focus on identity? “Because of the coexistence of the state’s policy rejecting 
Kurdish identity and the request of the Kurds to maintain their identity, the Kurdish 
Question has remained unsolved” (Karakoc 2010: 919). The issue of identity comes up 
time and time again when investigating the so-called Kurdish issue.   
No unified theory exists about identity change, and why and how such an identity 
change will occur (Legro 2009: 38; Chandra & Laitin 2002: 2). Identity in itself may 
imply a social category which an individual is able to be a member of (Chandra 2006: 
400). Identity may also refer to individuals’ collective self-image as a group (Legro 
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2009: 40). Identity is, importantly, a dymanic concept, and may vary in scope and 
importance for the individual (Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999: 995). For this thesis, 
identity will mean a category a person describes herself as (Chandra & Laitin 2002: 2). 
What constitutes an ethnic identity is a contested subject, however Horowitz’ 
definition from 1985 is widely used. It identifies an ethnic identity as people 
possessing a myth of common heritage (Chandra 2006: 402). For the purpose of this 
study, the Kurds are seen as one ethnic group (Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999: 994). 
To investigate a rise of the Kurdish identity and its possible implications, Ashutosh 
Varshney’s (2003) assessment of the growth of ethnic identity will be used. According 
to Varshney, the creation of a strong state identity is possible, which – not uncontested 
- can be seen by looking at states such as France and Italy. Such an approach does not 
always succeed, one reason being minority groups tending to have typically stronger 
identity than the dominant group. Differences between groups within a state may lead 
to conflict: “…The issue is not cultural or religious diversity per se, but a relationship 
of dominance, subordination, and differential worth” (Varshney 2003: 92-93). Such 
relations are often historically built up. When hierarchies in a state are based on 
recognition and corresponding lack of recognition, conflicts may occur. Groups start 
protesting as modernity leads to the decrease of these hierarchies. At the same time, 
claims for equality rise (Varshney 2003: 92). Ethnic mobilization may occur in states 
with more than one ethnic identity. When cultural or linguistic cleavages are made, 
this gives room for mobilization based on identity (Varshny 2003: 93). Speaking of the 
Kurds in Turkey, these face non-material and material insecurities in areas such as 
language and culture (Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999: 998). This should give a firm 
basis for ethnic mobilization. A distinction between a private identity and a politicized 
identity here becomes necessary. Through a politicized identity, groups use their 
differences to claim their distinct rights from the state. Once an ethnic identity has 
successfully been politicized, it tends to dominate other identities such as religion, 
class or region (Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999: 995-998). The governmental 
repression of the Kurds has led to an approach by the Kurdish nationalists seeking to 
let all Kurds know of past injustices, in order to build a stronger, Kurdish identity. This 
implies building a politicized ethnicity (Romano 2006: 111). Thus, with increased 
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focus on the ethnic aspect and recognition, one would expect this identity to be 
dominating. The horrors put on the Kurds enabled a national consciousness spreading 
further than the elite (Romano 2006: 111), implying that the politicized identity would 
spread out to the more general Kurdish population. To pursue an ethnic mobilization, 
one initially needs a committed group of individuals (Varshny 2003: 93). Using the 
PKK as an example, one can see that such a group has existed, implementing 
rebellions to further mobilize based on ethnicity. The goal of so-called “ethnic 
entrepeneurs” such as the PKK is to promote an environment of insecurity, which will 
in turn lead to more politicized identity formation (Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999: 
999). Such a mobilization may also affect the individual. For the individual Kurds, 
several options on how to approach the issue of identity exist. He or she may accept 
the Turkish identity and apply this to him or herself. There may also be an acceptance 
of a civic Turkish identity, where the Kurd thus will see him or herself as a Turkish 
citizen of Kurdish origin. This corresponds to a more private identity, as opposed to a 
politicized identity. Thirdly, the Kurd may refuse the Turkish identity, implying a 
more politicized identity (Icduygu, Romano & Sirkeci 1999: 998). Although you 
initially did not participate in the mobilization, the very mobilization in itself can form 
your identity. This, however, depends on the state response (Varshny 2003: 93). As 
seen in the background chapter, the Turkish state response has included harsh 
measures and suppressing the Kurdish identity, paving way for insecurities and a 
subsequent rise of a politicized identity.   
How does one link the issues of identity, EU pressure and increased recognition? 
According to Kizilkan-Kisacik, pressure for recognition of minorities may in fact lead 
to harsh nationalist responses from the majority group (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 27). 
She argues that a shift in the societal level in the relationship between the Kurds and 
the Turks has occurred. The Kurdish identity has become more prominent and visible, 
with attacks and protests against Kurds have boomed. Recognition of minority groups 
within Turkey has in fact led to nationalistic Turkish response (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 
29). “…[T]he EU reforms and the recent “Democratic Opening” project of the AKP 
has triggered harsh reactions at the political, societal, and institutional level” 
(Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 28). Analyzing EU’s impact on identities through pressuring 
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for increased recognition becomes central. Has EU pressure contributed to a rise of 
identity amongst young Kurds? One should focus on the magnitude of EU pressure 
through Europeanization theory. Because “(i)t is only through analyzing the impact of 
EU on policies, identities, and beliefs concurrently that the real impact of the EU can 
be captured” (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 33).  
 
3.3. Europeanization   
The EU has been seen as an attractive alternative for several applicant countries, 
including Turkey (Olsen 2002: 927). Ulusoy (2009: 364) states that “(t)he prospect of 
EU membership is univocally considered as the main causal factor of the recent 
progress in Turkey regarding democratic reform”. Following this line of thought, 
Turkey’s transformation in the realms of politics may be seen as visible examples of 
European structural impact on Turkey. Linking Turkey’s democratic progress with the 
prospect of EU membership shows the importance of EU’s presence and thus the need 
for a conceptualization of this impact. Europeanization as a term has been widely 
discussed within European studies and contains a variety of definitions, making it 
difficult to grasp. The concept is wide and stretching beyond the mere adoption of 
legal provisions (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 7). It is broadly agreed, however, that 
Europeanization constitutes a transfer of what is referred to as “European” to other 
jurisdictions, beliefs and norms. Signals and pressures from Europe are interpreted and 
modified through domestic identities and institutions. Europeanization in this sense 
emphasizes the relations with non-European [here: non-EU] actors (Olsen 2002: 936-
37). Europeanization may be used to investigate how international pressure leads to 
changes in domestic policies (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 6). For this thesis, 
Europeanization will refer to a process of transformation on the domestic level, 
particularly in the realms of protection and promotion of minority rights. The adaption 
of Europeanization “…reflects variations in European pressure as well as domestic 
motivations and ability to adapt” (Olsen 2002: 936). Turkey, with its history of close 
relations with Europe and the EU, is an interesting example in this regard. To 
investigate how Europeanization has possibly affected identities in Turkey, one must 
proceed to look at EU’s influence on the domestic level. Seeing that “Europeanization 
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conditions profound changes in Turkish politics” (Ulusoy 2009: 377), the domestic 
level becomes the natural level of analysis when problematizing the impact of the EU 
in the realms of minority rights and minority recognition in Turkey.   
Importantly, one should note that Europeanization is not an uncontested theory and has 
been criticized for leading to only shallow domestic changes in candidate countries. 
When studying the effects of Europeanization, there has arguably been a revival of 
nationalism and ethnic-based identities which may act as a resistance to the whole 
Europeanization concept (Olsen 2002: 936). Still, the magnitude of the 
Europeanization pressure should be looked at with the individual in mind.   
 
3.3.1. Effects of Europeanization – conditions required for domestic change  
The effects of Europeanization on the domestic scene will be further analyzed by using 
Borzel and Risse’s (2000) conditions assessing how Europeanization may lead to 
domestic political change. Olsen claims that “(t)he domestic effect of Europeanization 
can be conceptualized as a process of change at the domestic level in which the 
member states adapt their processes, policies, and institutions to new practices, norms, 
rules and procedures that emanate from a emergence of a European system of 
governance” (Borzel & Risse 2000: 6). This process is dependent on two necessary 
conditions. First, a misfit or inconvenience between the Europeanization process and 
the domestic process has to exist. This will in turn create so-called adaptional 
pressures, which are prerequisites for policy change. The adaptional pressure increases 
the lower the compatibility is between the domestic and the European processes, 
policies and institutions (Borzel & Risse 2000: 5). The strength of the adaptional 
pressures depends on the already existing structures in the state – the so-called 
goodness of fit (Grigoriadis 2008: 23).  Secondly, institutions or actors able to 
facilitate the changes and respond to the adaptional pressures need to be present 
(Borzel & Risse 2000: 2). If domestic structures do not fit with the adaptional 
pressures, this will often lead to loud reactions from domestic actors and may turn the 
outcome of the Europeanization process to be not guaranteed (Grigoriadis 2008: 23). 
Only when the two conditions are in place, one may start to speak of domestic effects 
of Europeanization.    
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There are three degrees of domestic change showing Europeanization’s impact, 
according to Borzel and Risse. The first notion is absorption, where member states are 
able to incorporate the ideas of Europeanization without significantly changing the 
already existing legislation. In certain instances, governments will respond to 
Europeanization pressure and adapt on their own terms, however with adaptions 
influenced by arrangements already in place in the particular state (Olsen 2002: 935). 
Such an approach may also be evident in Borzel and Risse’s second category: 
accommodation. Here, European pressure is met by adapting existing processes and 
actually changing them, however importantly without changing essential features or 
the underlying motivations and conceptions behind the changed policies. This leads to 
a modest degree of change. The third approach, transformation, goes further than the 
others and can be seen in instances where European policies and processes are being 
fully adopted. In such cases change is seen as significant (Borzel & Risse 2000: 5-9). 
Two approaches suggest different effects of Europeanization. For this thesis, emphasis 
is put on the second approach – the sociological institutionalism, which focuses on the 
shift of norms and identities through EU pressure. It is noteworthy, however, that these 
approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first approach, rationalist 
institutionalism, suggests that the abovementioned misfits and the following adaptional 
pressures provide actors with both new opportunities as well as constraints to achieve 
their aims. This approach treats actors as rational and goal-oriented (Borzel & Risse 
2000: 2-6). When Europeanization occurs, the political opportunity structure changes, 
followed by a possible redistribution of power at the domestic level, which might lead 
to domestic change. In the rationalist institutionalism approach, the higher adaptional 
pressure existing, the more likely it becomes that domestic actors will press for change 
in order to achieve policy changes. Adaptional pressures of medium scale will lead to 
domestic transformation in the event of formal institutions being supportive, however 
the adaption may end up being accommodative or even absorbent (Borzel & Risse 
2000: 10). This is connected to Kizilkan-Kisacik’s (2010: 8) so-called “policy-
Europeanization”, where the EU pressures states to comply with EU norms and 
standards on the domestic policies of the states. Policy areas traditionally under the 
jurisdiction of the state – such as minority rights – are gradually transferred to the EU 
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level. The more pressure put on the state, the more they should comply with EU, this 
approach suggests. A second view on the domestic effects of Europeanization is the 
sociological institutionalism approach. Here, the process of persuasion is in focus. The 
misfit between Europeanization and domestic norms and identities lead to changes in 
the domestic structure and the internalization of new norms and identities. Societal 
“change agents” persuade others to change their norms and identities, and at the same 
time, a particular political culture exists leading to consensus-building. Through a 
socialization process, thus, new identities are formed and internalized (Borzel & Risse 
2000: 2). Sociological institutionalism makes actors strive to fulfill social expectations. 
In this sense, Europeanization can be seen as new rules, meanings and norms which in 
turn have to be incorporated in the domestic structure. This approach argues that if 
adaptional pressure is high, the domestic response will be inertia – as you cannot 
simply replace existing norms and identities. Domestic actors, if under heavy pressure 
to change, will often resist doing so. According to this approach, medium adaption 
pressure most likely leads to changes in the long run (Borzel & Risse 2000: 8-11). This 
approach is linked to what Kizilkan-Kisacik (2010: 9) refers to as “societal 
Europeanization”, a process in which beliefs and opinions are subject to 
Europeanization and actors’ preferences are affected by EU norms. Socialization in 
this way refers to the internalization process leading to norms becoming part of the 
national identity (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 10). What one can see from both approaches 
is that a misfit is necessary in order for changes to occur. Furthermore, adaptional 
pressures created by the misfit alone is not sufficient, as there has to be factors 
enabling – or hindering – the domestic change. Thus, the more adaptional pressure 
placed on institutions and collective identities, the more one needs socialization or 
learning pathway to ensure a durable change (Borzel & Risse 2000: 13). The two 
elements do not have to go hand in hand, as EU pressure may lead to changes on 
formal rules, without the internalization of norms leading to changes in people’s self-
perception (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 10). This, however, becomes puzzling. Is it 
possible that the EU pressure is currently less effective bringing about change on 
formal rules, whereas it has contributed to an internalization of norms in fact leading 
to changes in people’s self-perception? It is clearly interesting to look at how Turkey 
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has responded to EU pressures to reform “their illiberal minority politics” (Grigoriadis 
2008: 23). Having looked at Europeanization at the domestic level, it is necessary to 
have a closer look at the notion of Europeanization in the Turkish context, and how the 
European-level integration plays a significant role in relation to domestic Turkish 
policies and politics (Ulusoy 2009: 364).   
 
3.4. Europeanization in Turkey  
When speaking of EU pressure, Turkey can be seen to be subject to Europeanization 
due to its legal and institutional ties with the EU, its geographical location and its 
historical sensitivity to European changes (Ulusoy 2009: 377). The EU hosts a large 
number of programs and civil society developments in Turkey and other candidate 
countries (Kubicek 2005: 363). Particularly when speaking of the democratization 
process, the relationship with EU has been of large importance for Turkey (Oguzlu 
2004: 94). As Ulusoy (2009: 377) notes, “…democratization constitutes the essence of 
Europeanization in Turkey”. This is, however, a fairly recent view. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the EU did not openly state the possibility of union membership as a 
viable option for Turkey, the cost of compliance in particular with regards to the 
Kurdish minority and the political role of the military were intolerably high for the 
elites in Turkey, and consequently led to little changes in the Turkish domestic 
policies. This approach changed in 1999 when Turkey became an EU candidate 
country (Kubicek 2005: 365; Ulusoy 2009: 364). Seen as a high point in the Turkey-
EU relations, Turkey identified accession as a viable option, however only if the state 
pursued a significant number of large reforms (Kubicek 2005: 365). Turkey obliged 
itself to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria as well as the resolution of border problems of 
the International Court of Justice (Ulusoy 2009: 375). Several “harmonization” reform 
packages included the much-sought for abolition of the death penalty, limiting 
punishment for insulting state institutions and implementing more liberal provisions 
for freedom of assembly (Kubicek 2006: 366). These reforms clearly suggest a change 
in Turkish policies in line of – at a minimum - accommodation. After the AKP 2002 
election victory further reforms were implemented in areas such as women’s rights, 
trade union rights and minority rights. Significant constitutional changes and reforms 
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thus occurred at a considerable scale from 1999 to 2004, when the European 
Commission recommended an introduction of accession negotiations with Turkey 
(Ulusoy 2009: 375-376).   
Turkey’s approach also met criticisms. Claims were made that the Turkish reforms 
were made merely because Turkey “was told to do so”, i.e. that the reforms could be 
short-lived and vulnerable to changes in the event of a new election, and that the 
government was in fact reluctant to the reforms (Kubicek 2005: 362; Tocci 2008: 886). 
According to Toktas and Aran (2009: 713), Turkey on one hand tried to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria for the cultural rights of minorities, but on the other hand also 
pursued restrictions and barriers to the rights of groups which might in fact have paved 
way for a forced recognition of minority groups. This would imply that reforms 
undertaken were not “deep” enough to suffice significant and durable change – 
reforms thus implemented without changing underlying features and identities, as the 
sociological institutionalist approach requires. Shortcomings of the reform process 
could be attributed to the limited nature of the diffusion of European norms, but also 
bureaucratic inertia and a lack of cooperation with elites (Grigoriadis 2008: 38). Still, 
one may see that “the EU provided a necessary push for reforms, creating a supportive 
international environment” (Kubicek 2005: 367). Having seen some of the possible 
effects of Europeanization in Turkey, one should have a closer look at the EU’s role in 
the specific Kurdish issue.    
 
3.5. EU’s effects on conflict resolution: Conditionality and social learning  
The EU has been engaged in the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds. 
With Turkey’s enlargement process being in a deadlock, however, the EU may no 
longer have the same leverage on the conflict, as “EU’s capacity in conflict resolution 
is dependent on the enlargement process” (Celik & Rumelili 2006: 221). However, the 
EU framework did enable the conflict parties to alter their beliefs of their interests in 
the conflict (Celik & Rumelili 2006: 221). This arguably led to a larger emphasis on 
cultural rights for the Kurds, and the Europeanization pressure made Turkey start 
looking at the Kurdish issue as a democratization issue (Celik & Rumelili 2006: 212-
213; Tocci 2008: 878).   
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Two visible elements when speaking of EU mechanisms to foster change in Turkey 
will be further investigated. The first is the conditionality principle. In this, the EU can 
be seen to have had powerful incentives for domestic change in Turkey. Two types of 
conditionality may be identified. Firstly, positive conditionality, which implies 
promises of benefits. In the Turkish case, conditionality would equal EU membership. 
The Copenhagen criteria is one example of conditionality – or more specifically ex 
ante conditionality, meaning that certain criteria would have to be fulfilled in order for 
Turkey to proceed with their membership process (Tocci 2008: 882). The other type, 
negative conditionality, is identified as punishments – such as sanctions. 
Conditionality may also have more indirect effects, affecting policy fields linked to 
conflict resolution, for instance the EU demanding Turkey to abolish the death penalty 
(Tocci 2008: 883).   
The second element is the so-called social learning aspect. Here, wider social learning 
and contact between the EU and conflict parties may change and develop the conflict 
parties’ perceived interests, beliefs and purposes regarding e.g. their views on human 
rights, identity, sovereignty or democracy (Tocci 2008: 883). The social learning 
aspect can be promoted by the EU through contact and dialogue with conflict parties. 
Here, perceived interests and norms are internalized. This connects to Checkel’s 
“socialization”, where the end goal of internalization would imply that actors induct 
themselves into new norms and rules. To reach internalization, one way is through 
persuasion, seen as a communication process developing new beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours (Checkel 2007: 4). This can be clearly be linked to the sociological 
institutionalism, and is an interesting aspect, as it suggests that the EU pressure and 
presence have been contributing to parties changing their identities. One should also 
not forget NGOs and civil society, which have triggered learning effects beyond the 
elite level (Tocci 2008: 891).   
 
3.6. Identity theory and Europeanization – can EU effects be isolated?   
Can the proposed ethnic identity growth be explained by Europeanization at all? It is 
difficult to isolate the effect of the EU on domestic incentives for legal, institutional or 
behavioral changes, which might lead to an exaggerated view of the effects of the EU 
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(Sasse 2009: 18). One should be careful to assess domestic preferences coming from 
Europeanization alone – domestic preferences might come from exogenous factors and 
not in response to Europeanization per se (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse 2001: 220). It 
should also be noted that other factors than the EU may have led to changes and an 
increased identity awareness amongst Kurds in Turkey – such as Abdullah Öcalan’s 
capture in 1999 corresponding with the end of large-scale violence in Turkey’s 
southeastern parts. Also, steps taken by Turgut Özal’s presidency in the early 1990s 
may have contributed to identity growth, together with reforms pursued under the 
AKP government (Tocci 2008: 878). Still, as Kubicek (2005: 364) notes, evidence 
from Turkey suggests that the EU membership prospect was what has led to political 
change. Ulusoy (2009: 364-368), however critical of Europeanization as the only 
means to explain political transformation in Turkey, still claims that the process of 
Europeanization does change interactions, and also provides restructuring 
opportunities for Turkey’s many civil society organizations. EU pressure may also 
have contributed to that moderate Kurds and Turks have gotten a new platform to meet 
and discuss issues of identity (Tocci 2008: 893). In this way, perceived interests have 
been altered in the face of EU involvement (Celik & Rumelili 2006: 221). Arguably, 
through EU’s involvement, new patterns of recognition and exclusion of minority 
rights has been introduced. This has on the one hand led to an extended recognition of 
minority groups, however may ultimately lead to the reinforcement of the “otherness” 
of the minority group, leading minority groups to become both increasingly recognized 
and also more exposed to discrimination (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 6). This interesting 
aspect will be further looked at in the analysis section. To sum up, the assessment of 
Europeanization theory and identity awareness suggest how the EU may have changed 
and brought about new attitudes, beliefs and identities, which may not necessarily be 
corresponding with formal changes (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 5-6). How is this alleged 
shift in beliefs and identities for the Kurds due to EU pressure looked upon by the 
Kurds themselves – and in what ways can such a development be problematic? This 
should be further investigated in the analysis chapter – however, only after assessing 




Ch 4. Research methods  
4.0 Choice of research methods  
Having stated the research question and the theoretical background of 
Europeanization, minority rights and identity growth, the following section will deal 
with the choice of research methods. Aspects of the theory used for the research is also 
of interest with regards to the chosen methods (George & Bennett 2005: 77). The 
aspects of the theory investigated here, will be the way Europeanization and identity 
growth can be used to identify and problematize EU pressure. As the opinions of both 
experts as well as young people of minority background is of interest to the research 
questions, choosing a research method suited for such investigation is important, in 
order to gain as much and as clear information as possible. For this research, where the 
aim is to obtain the personal and detailed opinions from different people, the most 
appropriate approach seems to be qualitative method.    
    
4.1. Qualitative method  
Qualitative method is designed to pursue an exploration of the lives, opinions and 
actions of people or groups, and is clearly sensitive to the social world. It involves 
words rather than numbers (Chambliss et.al: 223). As Bryman (2008: 366) states, 
qualitative method is often characterized by an inductive relationship between theory 
and research, and an interpretivist position - implying an understanding of the social 
world through interpreting its participants. This differs from quantitative method, 
mainly taking on a deductive approach. Qualitative method seeks in-depth information 
– usually using smaller numbers than what is common in quantitative research. The 
goal is, however, still to make valid inferences – meaning that the qualitative 
researcher has to be aware of the methodological issues arising from the choice of a 
qualitative study (King et.al 1994: 229). Qualitative research also has to be careful not 
to be “theory-less”, i.e. that it strives to explain on what theoretical basis it was formed 
and how the data was gathered leading to the conclusions (Diefenbach 2008: 878).  
Qualitative research interviews are, together with observation, commonly used 
methods within qualitative research. The interviews are based on the social interaction 
between the interviewee and the interviewer. It is important that the interviewer has 
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significant knowledge of the theme of the interview, in order to be able to ask well-
formulated and effective follow-up questions (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 99). How the 
researcher chooses to define the research question in qualitative method varies in terms 
of how explicit the question is formed (Bryman 2008: 371). However, conducting 
interviews will undoubtedly expand the interviewer’s knowledge and perspective, and 
may thus help to develop or change the original notions about the research – another 
important feature in qualitative research (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 128).   
 
4.1.1. Key features and criticism of qualitative method  
Qualitative research has tended to be described as merely what quantitative research is 
not, which fails to lead to new understandings (Bryman 2008: 367). Qualitative 
method and empirical research has repeatedly been criticized from a methodological 
perspective. Certain elements should indeed be discussed when choosing a qualitative 
approach for this research, to conclude whether the choice of this particular method is 
justified.  Initially, the most pressing issue regarding the improving of data quality is to 
record and report how the specific data has been generated (King et.al 1994: 23). 
Reporting, in short, should be done so that the information is available to others 
wishing to apply the particular methods (King et.al 1994: 23). The researcher is 
responsible for who gets a larger say in the qualitative study, and what should be 
included and consequently excluded. This leads to the natural understanding that two 
researchers would never come up with the exact same results in a qualitative study, as 
the researcher him/herself is crucial for the making of the research (Diefenbach 2008: 
885). Still, as noted, reporting and recording how the data has been gathered secures 
that a degree of replicability is possible.   
A common criticism of qualitative method has been that such research is biased due to 
the researcher's personal perceptions. Qualitative research, thus, is seen as too 
subjective (Bryman 2008: 391).  Naturally, it has to be taken into account that the 
researcher has his or her own perspectives, biases and prejudices. The so-called human 
factor, that the researcher affects the research with own views, is however evident in 
all research – although it is clear that qualitative research is more prone to 
subjectiveness (Diefenbach 2008: 875-7). Still, this problem has to be dealt with in all 
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social science, and the question becomes, rather than removing it, how to decrease the 
subjectiveness as much as possible. Another criticism has involved the often numerous 
changes of the research question – which in quantitative research may prove to be of 
large, negative significance. However, as Diefenbach notes, qualitative research is 
explorative. This means that the research question is not always a known factor at the 
outset of the research, and may change or develop as the research goes on. In this 
sense, changing the research question becomes a sign of the research progressing, 
signaling that the researcher has gotten closer to what he or she really wants to 
investigate (Diefenbach 2008: 877). Whether the collection of the data is really 
representative, is another question which has attracted attention regarding qualitative 
method. The researcher may be criticized of merely choosing a sample of his or her 
own interest. However, in qualitative research, one does not have to select the data 
“objectively” - only ensure that the subjects selected are appropriate for the 
investigation. The unit of investigation, thus, is what counts in qualitative research 
(Diefenbach 2008: 878). When it comes to generalization, the question arises whether 
a qualitative sample can be generalizable to the rest of the population. This criticism, 
however, fails to hit its target, as “... the findings of qualitative research are to 
generalize to theory rather than to population” (Bryman 2008: 391). Some researchers 
have also claimed that a degree of generalizability is in fact possible, implying a so-
called “moderatum generalization” (Bryman 2008: 392). One should, lastly, not forget 
that also a great number of similarities between quantitative and qualitative research 
exists, despite the numerous examples highlighting their differences. Bryman (2008: 
394-5) identifies both methods as focusing on data reduction, answering research 
questions, relating data analysis and relevant literature as well as seeking transparency. 
There are a number of elements which have to be taken into consideration before 
conducting the actual research. Amongst them, as far as possible to ensure that the 
research is valid and reliable, that the selection of interviewees has been sampled with 
caution and that the research is meeting ethical standards, are vital. Before proceeding 
to the choice of interview as a method, these considerations will be further discussed.
  
4.2. Validity  
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How to increase the validity of the research is a central aspect for any researcher. 
Meaning that we measure what we think we measure, validity is important to 
maximize the effects of the study (King et.al 1994: 25). One part of this is the so-
called measurement validity, referring to whether indicators of measurement are 
measuring what the researcher actually intends to measure (Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 
12). Another aspect is internal validity. This will occur whenever one can draw a 
correct conclusion that A leads to B. What causes what is a central focus point for 
researcher, which leads internal validity to be of great importance to scholars 
(Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 14).  
A related and equally important concept is generalizability or external validity. Here, 
one speaks of the ability to draw general conclusions for a whole group, population or 
setting. If one draws a sample, for instance, it is possible to generalize results back to 
the group which the sample was drawn from. However, drawing conclusions from this 
sample based on other groups, is something a researcher should be careful about 
(Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 14). As discussed above, generalizability is often 
problematic when speaking of qualitative method, due to the often small samples and 
case studies (Bryman 2008: 383).  The researcher should keep in mind that the 
research questions may have alternative explanations than the hypothesis – and that the 
depended variable may be affected by values outside, which are elements not taken 
into consideration (King et.al 1994: 222). Such spurious effects are of great 
importance to minimize as much as possible. Notably, all qualitative researchers do 
not apply the criterion of validity and reliability to qualitative research, as they are of 
the opinion that these measures were made mainly for quantitative purposes and are 
thus not applicable (Bryman 2008: 383).  
 
4.3. Reliability  
Having looked at different types of validity, one should proceed to assess reliability. If 
a measure is reliable, it is less affected by what one calls random error. A concept is 
reliable if the results are consistent and do not change greatly if the circumstances stay 
the same (Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 96; King et.al 1994: 25). This is not validity – as 
the results may be the same, but wrong, when they are being measured. This 
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underlines the importance of obtaining both validity and reliability (Chambliss & 
Schutt 2010: 97). By securing a large degree of both validity and reliability, the 
researcher can ensure that the research is less error-prone. A common remark has been 
that qualitative research is hard to replicate because of its unstructured nature (Bryman 
2008: 391). Problems may include that interviewees may die or disappear or that 
observations altogether cannot be replicated (King et.al 1994: 26). So-called external 
reliability can be hard to obtain in qualitative research, as one cannot freeze the social 
setting in which the research has taken place (Bryman 2008: 376). Indeed, ensuring 
that the data and analysis is replicable is a key concern for any researcher. Here, the 
entire reasoning behind the process and the conclusions should be able to be traced 
(King et.al 1994: 26).   
 
4.4. Operationalization  
The concepts of the research have to be conceptualized and made measurable 
(Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 73). In order to conceptualize, one needs a clear definition 
of what a concept entails. Chambliss and Schutt (2010: 75) states that a concept 
contains a “… mental image that summarizes a set of similar observations, feelings, or 
ideas”. One single concept may, however, entail different meanings. One should keep 
in mind that definitions about concepts need to be explicit (Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 
75). For this particular thesis, the concepts “minority rights”, “identity awareness” and 
“Europeanization” are in need of operationalization in order to clarify what the 
concepts mean and make it understandable for the interviewees.   
 
4.5. Case study  
The research chosen is an example of a case study. A case study is “... an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of evidence” (Noor 2008: 1602). Case studies can be seen as 
concerned with how and why things happen and focuses on a particular issue or 
feature (Noor 2008: 1602). The following analysis regarding case studies is taken from 
George and Bennett's (2005) book on case studies and theory development. The case 
study approach is “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to 
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develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” 
(George & Bennett 2005: 5). A case study implies one well-defined aspect of a 
historical episode more than a whole historical episode (George & Bennett 2005: 18). 
The Europeanization of Turkey in regards to minority rights and identity fits well into 
this framework, as it is one class of events in relation to a historical event – the 
development and protection of minority rights in Turkey.   
 
4.5.1. Strengths of case studies  
Historically, case studies have been categorized as “small-N” studies, contrasting to 
the statistical “large-N” studies with a large number of observations (George & 
Bennett 2005: 17). The debate between these two types of studies has been vigorous 
for decades (King et. al 1994: 4). Case studies may have a number of advantages. 
Firstly, case studies have high conceptual validity which might help the researcher to 
come up with new hypotheses. Meaning that the measure of the indicators representing 
the concepts intended to be measured is as correct as possible, is vital (George & 
Bennet 2005: 72). Many concepts are hard to measure as they may entail different 
meanings in different contexts. A challenge for the researcher thus becomes to find 
analytical equivalences to measure the concepts in the best way possible. To consider 
contextual factors is a natural part of this process – and is comparatively easy to 
pursue in case studies (George & Bennett 2005: 19). Case studies also have an 
opportunity to achieve greater internal validity than statistical studies, which often 
have to pursue “conceptual stretching” or gathering largely different cases. Seeking to 
clarify concepts, statistical research often continues after a case study has been made 
(George and Bennett 2005: 19-20). Additionally, case studies are particularly useful in 
finding, exploring and shaping new hypotheses. If the research does not lead to the 
expected answers, a whole new theory may have to be identified. The unique use of 
primary sources makes case studies far more adaptable to new hypotheses than 
statistical studies which are using already existing data. Case studies also enable 
researchers to look closer at intertwined variables and how they are connected (George 




4.5.2. Possible pitfalls of case studies  
One should not forget the possible pitfalls of case studies. When cases are self-
selected, there is a chance that the research becomes biased and suffers from 
systematic error (George & Bennett 2005: 23). If the researcher's subjective biases 
lead to a selection of his or her favourite hypothesis to explain the outcome, this is a 
serious pitfall of the research. Importantly, case studies cannot conclude more than 
tentatively on how much a variable affects the outcome in a case. Case studies have 
frequently been criticized for entailing too few «degrees of freedom». However, case 
studies treat variables qualitatively – and where there are different predictions on the 
causal processes in a case, case studies may reject other possible explanations of a case 
(George & Bennett 2005: 29-51). Another criticism has been that case studies involve 
a clear lack of representativeness. It is important, then, to note that case studies do not 
seek to select “representative” cases and usually do not claim their results to be 
applicable to other populations (George & Bennett 2005: 30).   
 
4.6. Sampling  
Who should be interviewed, is a core concern for any researcher. For this thesis, a 
method of purposive sampling was used. This type of sampling implies that the 
researcher does the unit selections and that sampling may occur at more than one level 
(Bryman 2008: 375). The type of sampling is strategic, seeking to interview people 
whom the researcher believes will be relevant for the research question (Bryman 2008: 
458). Importantly, the unit of investigation has to be suitable for the type of problem to 
be investigated (Diefenbach 2008: 879). Thus, getting the opinions of people who have 
in fact experienced the events which are the matters of discussion, strengthens the 
study.  
 
4.7. The interview  
After looking at some of the questions and challenges regarding qualitative method, 
what are the main advantages and disadvantages of using semi-structured interviews? 
When using qualitative methods, a common approach has been to select a research 
design using interviews. After all, “...(t)he interview is probably the most widely 
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employed method in qualitative research” (Bryman 2008: 436). The core focus of 
qualitative interviews is flexibility. This allows for the asking of follow-up questions 
to obtain richer and more detailed and personal answers from the interviewees 
(Bryman 2008: 437). The interview in this way becomes a conversation with a certain 
degree of structure (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 23).  Qualitative interviews emphasize 
the interviewee's opinions and points of view to a much larger degree than does the 
quantitative interview. Moving away from the main points of the research is also a 
possibility and much more appreciated in qualitative research, again reinforcing the 
focus on flexibility.   
There are, however, also certain challenges when conducting interviews in qualitative 
research methods. The researcher should be careful when framing questions, to avoid 
these being interpreted as critique. The researcher is evidently in the stronger position 
during an interview and must be aware of his or her role. The interviewer decides the 
topic and asks the questions, as well as decides what responses should be in focus 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 52).  The interviewer has to be aware of his or her effect 
on the interviewee and the whole interview situation. The interviewer intervenes and 
forms the questions and naturally also to some extent the answers given (Diefenbach 
2008: 880). The whole interview situation depends on the relationship between the 
interviewer and the interviewee – and to what extent the interviewer is successfully 
able to create an environment in which the interviewee feels safe to speak his or her 
mind without obstacles (Kvale 2007: 8). The asymmetry in the interview situation, 
thus, has to be taken into consideration by the interviewer. In organizations, for 
instance, the willingness of the powerful members of the organization will to a great 
extent determine who will be interviewed. In this sense, these central people may be 
able to form or turn the research in their own fashion. Attention will have to be paid to 
who the interviewees are and how one can reach people with various thoughts and 
views on the research topic (Diefenbach 2008: 880). All voices should, importantly, be 
heard - and it should furthermore not be unclear how the participants for the research 
have been chosen, going back to the points about reporting how the research is made 
(Bryman 2008: 392). Another point is that the interviewee may deliberately attempt to 
mislead the interviewer with his or her answers. One reason for doing so will be if the 
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questions asked are of sensitive character, making the interviewee wish to answer in a 
way which will put him or her in a better light than what would have been the case, 
had the interviewee answered the questions truthfully (Skogerbø 2010; Diefenbach 
2008: 880). Thus, the interviewer may end up with answers confirming already 
existing stereotypes. The researcher should try to avoid such conclusions by examining 
all statements critically and carefully (Diefenbach 2008: 881).   
When speaking of sampling, questions arise regarding the choice and numbers of the 
sample. Can people who are not randomly sampled be representative? Bryman (2008: 
391) claims that qualitative interviews are not preoccupied by being representative for 
all. Secondly, how many people should be interviewed, is a question which surely will 
come up in qualitative research. If the number of interviewees is too small, this will 
raise questions regarding the representativeness of the subjects. Are they trustworthy? 
According to King et.al (1994: 213), the number of observations necessary depends on 
the chosen research design. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 129) state that a common 
number of interviews is somewhere between 10 and 15 – often due to the size of the 
research and the principle that more interview objects will provide the research with 
little new knowledge. One approach is to interview until “saturation” is achieved; thus, 
that more interviews will fail to provide the research with new insights (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2009: 129). Experiments conducted using interviews have suggested that, 
in fact, around 12 interviews were sufficient to obtain most of the data needed for the 
further coding and analysis and thus get to a level of theoretical saturation, meaning 
you reach the level where more interviews would generate similar answers to the 
results you are getting (Bryman 2008: 462). Diefenbach (2008: 883) refers to 
quantitative research and claims that qualitative research has no links to the numbers 
of interviewees and the generalizability of the answers. If, however, interviews with 
different people generates similar answers, it enables the researcher to cross-check and 
thus increases the representativeness of the answers. Asking different people the same 
questions can increase the quality of the data for the interviewer and help the 
interviewer identify patterns (Diefenbach 2008: 882-3).  If the subjects are too few, 
this will affect the generalizability of the research, and if they are too many, it will 
interfere with the thoroughness of the research (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 129). 
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However, according to King et.al (1994: 208), even a small number of cases can 
sustain causal inference as long as the cases are compared with discipline. In 
qualitative interviewing, the question of how many interviews are needed, the answer 
will be “as many as you need to find out what you seek” (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 
129). As this must be determined by the researcher him/herself, “... there is no way of 
determining what number (of interviews) is sufficient” (Diefenbach 2008: 883). 
 
4.7.1 Semi-structured interview  
For this thesis, the semi-structured interview will be used. Here, the interviewees are 
asked using open-ended questions. This is an advantage in cases where the interview 
object should expand on his/her answers, and obtaining information outside the realms 
of the original question (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 69). In a semi-structured interview, 
the researcher has an interview guide, often including a list of questions and topics 
which should be covered during the interview. Although this allows for greater 
flexibility and follow-up questions, the pattern should resemble itself from one 
interview to the next (Bryman 2008: 438). The semi-structured interview may lead to a 
realisation of new concepts and theories as the interviews go along and the interviewer 
obtains new information (Skogerbø 2010). Semi-structured interviews may also lead to 
an increased understanding of social processes, as the researcher is able to ask people 
questions about a process or a time period leading up to a specific event (Bryman 
2008: 388). This will be done in this thesis, by asking people about what has happened 
with the identity of the Kurds in relation to EU pressure. Critique of semi-structured 
interviews includes, firstly, the possibility of open-ended questions making coding of 
the results more difficult (Corbin & Strauss 2008: 73). There has also been criticism 
regarding researchers deliberately choosing answers and results constituting the best fit 
to their research question and hypothesis (Pawson 1996: 299). Lack of generalizability 
has been a concern when speaking of semi-structured interviews. An ethical concern  
may be that the research question is too open-ended, making it difficult for the 
researcher to inform adequately about the nature of the research (Bryman 2008: 128). 
 
4.8. Ethical considerations  
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One of the most vital tasks for the researcher is to take sufficient ethical 
considerations. This implies that when conducting research, one should carefully 
consider ethical principles – including that participants are informed, not harmed, 
agree on their participation and that their privacy is not invaded. Furthermore, 
deception should be avoided by the researcher (Bryman 2008: 118). A central aspect is 
confidentiality (Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 42), implying an obligation to protect the 
interviewees’ privacy (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 90). The anonymity of the research 
subjects naturally is a part of this (Wood & Bloor 2006: 381). The researcher should 
also obtain informed consent. A consent form should be made to ensure that the 
research subjects agree to the terms and conditions of their participation and the 
general aims of the research and its implications (Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 58; 
Bryman 2008: 123; Wood & Bloor 2006: 379). For this research, two separate consent 
forms – one for the young Kurds and one for professors/experts - were made.  I 
presumed that all my research subjects would be literate, and thus pursued written 
rather than oral consent forms. According to Kvale and Brinkmann (2008: 79), ethical 
considerations have to be taken throughout the interview process and not only during 
the interview. Moral questions arise during the interviews, and the human interaction 
between the interviewer and the interviewee will affect the results of the interviews. 
Ethical issues should thus be considered from the project's outset (Wood & Bloor 
2006: 374). Additional elements relevant for this particular research also needs 
consideration; namely interviewing elite persons, interviewing people with a different 
culture and choosing an appropriate translator.  
 
4.8.1. Interviewing elite persons  
The experts were interviewed in order to get their views on the chosen subject, to see 
if these corresponded with the answers from the young Kurds. When conducting 
interviews with experts, new challenges arise. Firstly, elite persons may be difficult to 
get hold of. Furthermore, the expert or leader usually has a large amount of knowledge 
regarding the topic – the interviewer should thus strive to be as knowledgeable as 
possible, in order to «keep track» and understand the jargon used. The elite persons 
may prepare a sort of «speech» which may be challenging for the interviewer. If the 
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interviewer, however, proves him/herself as knowledgeable, this will again create 
respect and contribute to a more equal interview situation (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 
158-159).   
 
4.8.2. Interviewing people from a different culture and choosing translator  
One has to keep in mind the cultural differences when conducting interviews with 
people from another cultural background. The interviewer thus has to take time to get 
to know the culture where the interviews are taking place (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 
156). Hopefully, the 7 months I have spent in Turkey in total has made me more 
sensitive to the cultural differences between Turkey and Norway, in particular when 
speaking of non-verbal communication. Also, approaching local people prior to the 
research asking whether the questions were suitable made me more aware of the 
possible pitfalls the asking of sensitive questions could bring about. Choosing a 
translator who is both aware of his role as a pure translator and who is sufficiently 
linguistically skilled, is extremely important (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 156). In this 
instance, a student studying translation at Bogazici University was chosen to be the 
translator, which turned out to be a good choice. After having set the conditions for the 
research, one should move to the next chapter – the analysis of the pursued sem-
structured interviews.   
 
Ch 5 Analysis  
«…if they [the Turkish government] don't ask me for my reasons, I can just do 
anything. Just throw Molotov cocktails. I could just be a militant» (Efo 2012 
[interview]). 
 
5.0. Categories of analysis  
I will in this chapter present the results of my findings. I will use the categories of 
identity awareness and Europeanization pressure discussed in the theory chapter, in 
particular focusing on the sociological institutionalism approach. I will illustrate the 
findings with quotations from expert interviews, however mainly emphasizing the 
reflections of the young Kurds. Thus, subjective opinions and perspectives will be the 
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main focus of this part of the thesis, as typical for qualitative research. A subsequent 
comparing of the answers to identify patterns may, importantly, increase the quality of 
the study as a whole (Diefenbach 2008: 882-8). “EU accession was seen to offer the 
Kurds their best hope of an end to decades of oppression and violence, of seeing their 
rights protected and their status secured, and most importantly, the opportunity to […] 
have a say in their own futures” (Yildiz 2005: 28). With the hope of EU accession now 
– at least temporarily – gone (Aktar 2012 [interview]; Kirisci 2012 [interview]), how 
do young Kurds look at their own identities, current situation - and prospects for the 
future? As the research questions posed - can EU pressure help explain the rise of a 
Kurdish identity? What are the challenges and possible effects of a risen Kurdish 
identity – seen through the eyes of the individual? What are the young Kurds 
demands’ needed to be fulfilled to solve the long-lasting conflict? These questions will 
be further investigated. Young people seemed to me like a natural place to start. 
Having grown up with the conflict, they are also the future decision-makers of their 
societies. In times of an “EU deadlock”, how do young people assess their own 
situation? The starting point for this master thesis was to investigate the connection 
between the decreased EU leverage and the rise of identity amongst young Kurds in 
Turkey, and how the young Kurds themselves look at this development. Listening to 
the Kurdish youth might make it possible   
a) to focus on the young Kurds’ own views on the role of the EU in contributing to 
increased recognition and increased identity awareness  
b) to better identify how EU involvement in minority issues in accession countries can 
affect and possibly be problematic for the individual and  
c) to address the Kurdish demands for solving the conflict in light of decreased EU 
pressure 
One should remember that “Turkey’s minority regime does not consist only of legal 
foundations, but also has political, societal and cultural dimensions. It is also about the 
real-life situations of the minorities of Turkey” (Toktas & Aran 2009: 701). With this 
in mind, the starting point for the analysis is clear.  
 
5.1 General outline 
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The first part of the analysis will deal with the more general understanding of the topic 
of Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey. Are the young Kurds identifying the 
EU as a factor in changing Turkish governmental policies on minority rights? To what 
extent is EU pressure seen as contributing to a rise of recognition of the Kurdish 
identity and a subsequent rise of self-awareness? The second part of the analysis will 
deal with possible implications of a development with a risen Kurdish identity– as well 
as what potential problems Europeanization pressure as an example of third party 
involvement on minority issues can cause. In this section, focus will be given both to 
the young Kurds and to the professors. Lastly, the analysis will briefly discuss what 
the young Kurds see as necessary steps towards a solution to the long-lasting conflict, 
which turned out to be an interesting additional aspect.  
 
5.1.2 Sample 
As stated in the research methods chapter, the interviewees were chosen by purposive 
sampling. In total, 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted. 12 of them were 
conducted in and around Istanbul in January and February 2012 – with one additional 
interview held with a young Kurd residing in Copenhagen. Four of the eight young 
respondents were members of a car manufacturing trade union, two were students and 
two working in the service sector. The age spanned from around 20 to 35. I have 
chosen to give the young Kurdish informants new [Kurdish] names, to make the 
analysis easier to read.   
Female: DILARA, GULŞEN, ROBAR  
Male: MERDAN, RESWAN, FERHAT, EFO, BIJAR  
Furthermore, four professors and one associate professor from Bogazici, Koc and 
Bahcesehir Universities were interviewed using a separate interview guide.  
 
5.2. Research questions   
The research questions set forth were deliberately not completely defined at the outset 
of the study, in order to give the interviewees the chance to elaborate on the topic 
themselves, as Bryman (2008: 371) has stated an opportunity for the qualitative 
researcher. As qualitative method is explorative, a development or even change of the 
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research question may be a sign that the research is in fact progressing (Diefenbach 
2008: 877). In this case, the analysis will focus to a larger degree on the young Kurds’ 
own perceptions than initially planned. Hearing the frustrations from the young Kurds, 
it became clear that the main focus should lie on their own thoughts on identity, 
Europeanization and hopes for the future.   
 
5.3. Validity and reliability  
Trying to maximize the effects of the study and increase the validity is of vital 
importance in research (King et.al 1994: 25). The measurement validity of the study is 
believed to be quite high, as indicators of measurement could be explained thoroughly 
through the semi-structured interviews. Generalizability is seen as more problematic, 
dealing with a small sample of 13 respondents. However, the qualitative study and 
case study as such does not aim for generalizability (George & Bennett 2005: 30), 
seeking to generalize to theory rather than to the population (Bryman 2008: 391). 
When speaking of reliability, obtaining external reliability might prove challenging – 
however, hopefully the procedures followed in the research should be possible to trace 
and replicate (King et.al 1994: 26). One should also be careful about reductionist 
fallacy, in which incorrect conclusions are drawn from results on a different level of 
analysis – for example from the individual level to the country level and back 
(Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 38). For this particular research, it has been important to 
keep the findings about processes for the individual being kept on the individual level. 
  
5.4. Operationalization   
The concepts of “minority rights” “rise of identity” as well as “EU leverage” or 
“Europeanization” had to be operationalized in order to make them understandable for 
the interviewees. This challenge often occurs as words and terms might mean different 
things to different people (Chambliss & Schutt 2010: 73). In general, the term minority 
rights seemed to be well understood by the respondents, unlike the term 
Europeanization which had to be re-phrased to “EU pressure”, “how the European 
Union changes Turkish policies” or “influence of the EU on Turkey”. The respondents 
seemed in general well informed about the EU’s past pressure on Turkey and the 
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subsequent Turkish reform process. When it comes to rise of Kurdish identity, it was 
understood in terms of claims of recognition, linguistic rights and the expression of a 
separate Kurdish identity as opposed to the Turkish identity.   
 
5.5. RQ1 Do the interviewees themselves identify a rise of Kurdish identity – and 
do they believe that EU pressure has contributed to this rise?   
In order to investigate this first question, what is meant by “rise of identity” has to be 
defined. Assessing how an individual feels about his or her identity as a group member 
[i.e. ethnic minority] is necessary. If the majority society defines you as part of a 
certain minority, you will want to participate, argument goes, as lack of such 
participation will ultimately lead to a loss of your self-respect and dignity (Varshny 
2003: 93). Thus, increased recognition of a group will lead to more participation and a 
stronger feeling of membership in this particular group. This is interesting speaking of 
the Kurds in Turkey. “Freedom of expression, freedom of association, for the 
recognized minorities, it is existing. For the non-recognized, de facto, it's there” 
(Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview]). Seeing that it is Europeanization pressure which has 
led to a de facto recognition of the Kurdish identity and their rights as a minority 
(Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 31), and, similarly, that EU pressure led to large-scale reform 
for recognition of the Kurds (Kirisci 2011: 336; Somer 2008: 229), a connection 
between the EU pressure and the re-awakening and visibility of the Kurdish identity 
might be identified. Knowing that the struggle for the Kurdish identity has a long 
history, seen from Kurdish rebellions against the Turkish state as early as 1925, EU 
pressure may still be seen as important for the recognition of the Kurds as an ethnic 
group, and thus for its members’ self-perception. How is this interpreted and 
understood by the young Kurds interviewed? This part of the analysis will mainly 
focus on the sociologist institutionalism approach of Europeanization theory, 
underlining the importance of internalization of new norms and identities (Borzel and 
Risse 2000: 2), when a misfit between the Europeanization pressure and the domestic 
pressure exists. First, one should thus see whether there is an understanding that such a 
misfit exists, and then continue to assess whether such an internalization of norms and 
identities can help explain a rise in the Kurdish identity.   
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Thus; EU pressure   increased recognition  increased identity awareness?  
 
5.5.1. Respondents’ opinions on EU membership 
Pro-EU (5) Dilara, Robar, Gulsen, Merdan, Ferhat 
Anti-EU (2) Bijar, Efo 
Neutral (1) Reswan  
 
The general view amongst the respondents seemed to reflect this statement: “Kurdish 
people. Of course. They believe [in the EU] (…) because Kurdish problem, Turkey has 
no will to solve this problem, so they [the Kurds] believe maybe that the European 
Union, when Turkey join the European Union, that the problem could be solved. So 
they want. They support the European Union” (Ferhat 2012 [interview]). EU 
membership was depicted as being a clear advantage for the Kurdish people. The 
interviewees mainly agreed that the Kurds have seen the EU as highly beneficial 
(Tocci 2008: 887; Casier 2011: 1), and that “membership in the EU matters” (Cowles 
& Risse 2001: 221).  
However, not all respondents were positive about EU’s possible role.   
“Because it's an economical union so it's a union of capitalism so I don't want Turkey 
join that union. But if Turkey join this union, maybe human rights could be better” 
(Efo 2012 [interview]). This statement shows that, not surprisingly, not all Kurds are 
pro-EU. The number of pro-EU Kurds is also shrinking (Casier 2011: 1). However, the 
EU is still seen as a possible trigger for human rights reforms.  
To investigate whether the respondents identified a misfit between EU and Turkish 
policies on minority rights, a condition necessary for Europeanization to be effective, 
the magnitude of the respondents’ belief in the EU was looked at.   
  
5.5.2. Has EU pressure changed Turkish policies regarding the Kurds?  
Yes Ferhat, Efo, Robar, Bijar, 
Merdan 
Areas: the Kurdish issue, 




Only superficially  Dilara Areas: Turkey only pursuing 
superficial changes 
No answer Gulsen, Reswan  
 
The respondents seem to agree that a misfit exists between the Turkish government 
and the Europeanization process (Borzel & Risse 2000: 5), albeit disagreeing on the 
degree of change the EU is able to make. The responses spanned from seeing the EU 
as only having had superficial impact to the majority seeing the EU impact on Turkey 
as substantial – corresponding to alternative approaches of Europeanization’s leverage 
on domestic change. Most respondents believed that EU pressure could lead to 
changes for the Kurds and had done so in the Turkish membership process. It seems, 
as Borzel and Risse (2000: 13) claim, that the mere prospect of EU membership was 
seen as a factor enabling change to occur.  
 
5.5.3. Substantial change [transformation/absorption approaches]  
“(…) for Kurdish people, I think for us, [EU membership] it’s a very good thing. It’s a 
really good thing because if Turkey gets accepted, then they can’t really get accepted 
unless they accept us [Kurds]” (Robar 2012 [interview]).   
“The accession process was really beneficial. Because before that, there were just 
accusations to people, the violations of rights, and people disappeared in custody. And 
there were the burnings of villages, unidentified murders and so people were afraid to 
speak for their rights. In this [EU] accession process, Turkey had to take some steps. It 
became beneficial because the dissidents were able to get a fresh breath, and they 
started to express their opinions as well, and especially for Kurdish people” (Merdan 
2012 [interview]). The interviewees agreed that the EU has had an impact on changes 
regarding Turkish policies on the Kurds. Most claimed the change had been 
substantial, suggesting an absorption approach for Europeanization in the realms of 




5.5.4. Superficial change [accommodation approach]  
“They tried, I think European Union tried to change [Turkish policies], but if you see 
some European countries and you come back to Turkey, you can see that they tried to 
do something, and they want to do something, but they never do it really. I mean, they 
do very good at the very beautiful buildings, but at the inside it's not good (…) If 
Turkey will be member of the European Union, they [the Turkish government] will not 
give the right away. Give Kurdish people rights” (Dilara 2012 [interview]). 
This point can be seen in criticisms of the domestic impact of Europeanization, 
implying that Turkey’s membership might in reality cause little change for the 
minorities. One of the interviews emphasized limitations on recognition of the Kurds. 
“Kurds will continue to combat. In 1990s they didn't give up, regardless of the 
anonymous murders. Back then, they said there are no Kurdish people. Now, they 
accept this, but they say Kurds do not have rights, they say that Kurdish language 
exists but Kurds cannot speak it. [This says something about] the acceptance of 
Kurds” (Merdan 2012 [interview]). This would again suggest that the change in the 
Turkish context has been on a superficial level. Similarly, reforms pursued in the 
realms of broadcasting have been criticized to not be wide-reaching enough. “So [the 
government] just opened this channel for the benefit of the Kurds, but there are almost 
60 [Kurdish] words that are banned in the broadcast (…) They are manipulating, they 
wish to disrupt the language” (Efo 2012 [interview]). If only accommodation would 
appear in Turkey, reforms would be pursued, however without changing underlying 
features of the policies and without going deeper than a superficial change (Olsen 
2002: 935). However, the majority of the interviews suggested that the young Kurds in 
general believed that the EU did have considerable effects on Turkish policies 
regarding the Kurds. Turning to the more specific topic, what are seen as EU effects 
on the rise of the Kurdish identity?  
 
5.5.6. EU and the growth of Kurdish identity 
There are no requirements for EU candidate countries regarding minority rights, 
except the provision for “respect for and protection of minorities”. Without being 
specific, the EU pressure still tells governments to ensure minority rights (Kizilkan-
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Kisacik 2010: 9). “(Kurdish people) now say, they clearly say “Yes, I am Kurd”, (…) I 
see that some old people are afraid, some old Kurdish people are still afraid. When for 
example, my grandmother say to me that “don't say you are Kurdish because they can 
beat you” or something or ask you, but when we talk [to] young people, they are not 
afraid” (Dilara 2012 [interview]). According to the interviewees, EU pressure – albeit 
to a varying degree – has seemingly led to changes in the way the Kurds see their own 
situation. The main issue emphasized was increased recognition of the Kurds as a 
group. As mentioned, increased recognition may lead to greater identity awareness 
(Varshney 2003: 92). The respondents agreed on the EU having contributed to 
increased recognition of the Kurds as a group.   
“In an attempt to push Kurdish people to Western area, [the state] burned the whole 
villages. The aim was to assimilate them. EU accession process, EU just set up some 
criteria, and Turkey had to meet these criteria (…). In the accession process, this 
started to stop. For example, the burning of villages just stopped. And so the tortures 
in prison they just stopped, that's why socialists and Kurdish people or other 
dissedents are pro EU membership” (Merdan 2012 [interview]).  
A majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that the Kurdish identity was 
becoming more prominent, caused partly by EU pressure – thus agreeing with 
Kizilkan-Kisacik (2010: 9) that Europeanization arguably challenges the already 
existing power structures between the different groups in society, implying that 
minority groups are becoming increasingly aware of their rights. 
“[B]ack 10-15 years, to be able to speak Kurdish, and to be able to say “I am 
Kurdish”, was quite an issue, it could mean that you were a terrorist. But now, these 
issues started to go away from the pressures from the EU” (Bijar 2012 [interview]).  
This reinforces the sense of a strengthened Kurdish identity, with the EU playing an 
important part.  
 
5.5.7. Other factors leading to strengthened identity awareness  
Although most respondents noted that the EU was an important factor regarding the 
rise of Kurdish identity, other factors have to be taken into consideration.  
“When I was in high school, I couldn't say “I'm from Dersim”. You know, this is not 
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an official name of that city, it's called Tunceli. (...) And now, we are aware of that and 
people can say “I'm Kurdish. I'm a Kurd”. And absolutely this is because of the PKK 
struggle, PKK against the state. If there is no PKK, many people don't, didn't know, 
don't know their Kurdish origin” (Efo 2012 [interview]).  
This corresponds to Romano (2006: 160), claiming that the PKK both increased the 
number of Kurds identifying themselves as Kurdish and also led to an easier path for 
individuals to express their identity. The role of the civil society in promoting Kurdish 
identity could also be seen as a factor leading to increased identity awareness amongst 
young Kurds, seen through the presence of NGOs and the civil society in Turkey, 
triggering learning effects for the general society (Tocci 2008: 891) . The aim of this 
thesis is, however, not to exclude other factors as contributing to the rise of a Kurdish 
identity, but to highlight and problematize the possible effects of an EU involvement. 
The emphasis put on recognition of the Kurds as a group attributed to EU pressure 
would suggest, as the sociological institutionalism approach points to, that EU 
pressure might have led to an incorporation of new meanings and norms in the society 
(Borzel & Risse 2000: 6). This arguably also applies to the rest of the society, the 
majority of Turks increasingly aware of the “Kurdish difference”, an understanding 
intensified by the Turkish EU integration after 1999 (Somer 2005: 89). In this sense, 
EU pressure may have led to new acceptance for discussions aiming at redefining the 
Turkish national identity more inclusively (Grigoriadis 2008: 36) or even de-
scrutinizing the whole issue of the Kurds (Kirisci 2011: 338). The interviews 
reinforced this importance of the EU pressure, underlining that the EU could be 
influential in changing the situation for the Kurds. According to Yilmaz, the EU’s 
impact on minority rights change in Turkey has been substantial – however has been 
limited within the later years partly due to decreased credibility of EU conditionality 
and lack of clarity in minority definitions (Yilmaz, G. 2012: 3-4).  
In general, the Kurdish respondents seemed to think that the EU had been influential in 
giving them more space to openly state their identity through pushing for increased 
recognition of the Kurds as a group. This reflects the stance that the EU has led to an 
increase of different views on the Kurdish issue and a larger recognition of 
“Kurdishness” (Kirisci 2011: 345). This notion was also to some extent agreed to by 
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the professors. ”…[T]here is open discussion on things that were extreme sensitive in 
the past. And people are beginning to in public proclaim “they are”. At least portions 
of the society, not all, is open to admitting the mixtures” (Banias 2012 [interview]). It 
was broadly agreed that the EU pressure had waned in later years, however there was 
no mentioning of a Kurdish identity turning weaker or less significant due to a 
decrease in EU leverage. Rather, the respondents seemed to be of the opinion that the 
Kurdish identity is still rising. This corresponds to the expert interviews, where claims 
were made that a politization and radicalization of the Kurdish identity is taking place 
(Somer 2012 [interview]). This creates an interesting, however possibly disturbing 
puzzle. With the weakened pressure from the EU, what are possible implications of a 
continuous presence of a strong, Kurdish identity?  
 
5.5.8. The role of the EU in Turkey today – lack of leverage  
The membership conditionality has been identified as the by far most powerful “carrot 
and stick” mechanism for the EU (Celik & Rumelili 2006: 206). As the accession 
process has come to a halt, political reforms can be seen to have stopped. Tocci (2008: 
882) goes as far as saying “… the accession process has not prevented and may have 
contributed to the slowdown in Turkey’s political reforms since 2005”. Responses 
from the interviewed professors suggest that Turkey is not currently taking the EU 
membership very seriously nor seeing it as a viable option.   
“Europe has nothing to say anymore. Because they have lost the power of their 
leverage by letting politicians like Sarkozy for instance to tell Turkey “whatever you 
do, you won't become an EU member”. And the people think “okay! If it is so, why 
insist to work?” (Aktar 2012 [interview]). Although positive developments such as 
improvement of Turkey-France relations after the French presidential elections have 
been seen (Hurriyet Daily News 2012), the general cool relationship has led to an 
understanding that EU does not want Turkish membership. This has again diminished 
public support for both EU accession and for democratic reforms (Somer 2008: 235). 
For the Kurdish youth, the questions evolved around EU’s credibility, here seen as 
how the respondents looked at EU’s current capacity and willingness to pressure 
(Tocci 2008: 889). Having seen that the young Kurds believed that the EU had 
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pressured Turkey on the situation of the Kurds, one could possibly assess to what 
extent the respondents really believe in the EU’s current leverage. 
“I felt in the beginning, [the development between Turkey and the EU] was very fast. 
It was very, very fast development, but I think it kind of stopped now. There is nothing 
really new going on” (Robar 2012 [interview]).  
All the interviewees agreed to that the EU has less leverage on Turkey now than what 
they did in the previous years. There seemed to be a general frustration about the 
situation, and furthermore an agreement amongst the respondents that the situation is 
getting worse. “Yes, it's getting worse, I think. Since when, I don't know, I don't 
remember where it's best, so it's always, like very bad” (Dilara 2012 [interview]). 
Some of the respondents were also critical of the ambiguous nature of the minority 
rights’ regime and conditionality principle of the EU.   
“So, the European Union just calls Turkey to solve its problems, the Kurdish problem 
and the headscarf problems, and Europe just urges Turkey to use democratic 
procedures to deal with its problems. But they just, the [AKP] government is just doing 
exact opposite thing, actually” (Ferhat 2012 [interview]). This underlines the earlier 
mentioned nature of EU conditionality and that the EU itself has had an ambiguous 
stance towards minority rights (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 16). The responses from the 
young Kurds suggest that the EU at the moment lacks leverage. As mentioned in the 
theory chapter, there are also other factors which should be taken into account when 
discussing the magnitude of EU involvement on the rise of the Kurdish identity. As 
Tocci (2008: 881) claims, “[t]he EU could not have determined the resolution [of the 
Kurdish and the Georgian] conflicts alone”. For instance, Kurdish institutes have been 
established in the West to pressure and spread knowledge about the Kurdish question 
(Karakoc 2010: 934). In addition, the above-mentioned PKK presence, the history of 
Kurdish rebellions and the role of the civil society in Turkey should also be noted.  
 
5.8. Challenges of EU lack of leverage and risen identity  
Increased identity awareness + decreased pressure  decreased rights conflict?  
“If ascension to the EU also remains a plausible possibility, Kurds in Turkey could 
reasonably expect increasing protections and recognition of their identity as Kurds, 
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which would in turn leave fewer Kurds feeling that recourse to arms was necessary or 
justified” (Romano 2006: 165). The development in the later years, however, shows 
that EU accession is no longer in sight for Turkey. Recent events and riots in Turkey’s 
western provinces point to a more tense relationship between Kurds and Turks 
(Ensaroglu & Kurban 2011: 8-9).   
“(W)ithout [EU membership] perspective, Turkey won't move. And Europe will have 
less and less leverage which is the case now, on Turkey's overall transformation” 
(Aktar 2012 [interview]). Having seen that the respondents identify that the Kurdish 
identity indeed has risen, and that the EU has played a role in this respect - what can 
be seen as the challenges of the ethnic identity actually rising, combined with the 
weakening of EU leverage? Without being directly asked, all the professors recognized 
increasing problems in the relations between Kurds and Turks. Increasing polarization, 
discrimination and visibility of the Kurds were elements emphasized. According to 
Kizilkan-Kisacik (2010: 33), EU pressure has indirectly led to more discriminatory 
views on the Kurds, as they are now recognized as a group. Importantly, “the 
acceptance of an ethnic category within a civil discourse can be used for inclusion and 
equality as well as for exclusion and differentiation” (Somer 2005: 618). Could this be 
seen in the interviews?  
 
5.8.1. Increased polarization  
“An awakening of and politization of Kurdish identity in Turkey cannot be undone in 
the short term, if ever. Especially the Kurdish youth who came of age at the height of 
the PKK insurgency seem unlikely to ever assimilate to a Turkish ethnie. On the 
contrary, they could be expected to harbor radicalized views, derived from the conflict 
they witnessed around them as they grew up” (Romano 2006: 164). Murat Somer 
(2012 [interview]) claims that in terms of recognition of the Kurdish issue and the 
existence of a separate Kurdish identity, Kurds are definitely better off. The 
recognition of the Kurds has good sides – however also demonstrates a growing 
antagonism. Now, more young people are stating openly their ethnic background. The 
Turkish society today can be seen as more differentiated and more polarized, with 
some places in Turkey seeing an increased ghettoization. This is causing a higher 
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potential of ethnic conflict. Kirisci (2011: 340-342) also recognizes a growing 
polarization in the Turkish society after 2006-2007, coinciding with the rise of Turkish 
nationalism. This he explains by domestic factors such as the increase in PKK attacks, 
tension with the Kurds in Northern Iraq, however emphasizing that “[the] drift into 
nationalism and polarization also needs to be seen in light of the deterioration in 
Turkey-EU relations”.  
“(…) racism, Turkish – well, how can I describe it? The people being against Kurdish 
people is increasing (…) If you're Kurdish people from Eastern part of Turkey, you are 
accused of being potential criminals faithless people, like belonging to a terrorist 
organization. And they just want to discriminate us” (Reswan 2012 [interview]).  
This element of polarization was to some extent reflected in the interviews, where the 
interviewees recognized increased tension between the youth of Kurdish and of 
Turkish origin.  
 
5.8.2. Discrimination and ethnic identity  
Many of the interviewees mentioned discrimination as a factor of their dissatisfaction 
with Turkish policies. The types of discrimination varied from “Kurds being put into 
jail more often”, to places in Turkey with more racism and the little chance for Kurds 
to get high positions in workplaces. A special emphasis was put on the afore-
mentioned KCK case.   
“The freedom of expression in Turkey is quite low. There are many Kurdish, especially 
of Kurdish origin, in the prison, and these KCK operations, they are […], excuse for 
getting the Kurdish journalists into the prison” (Ferhat 2012 [interview]).   
“Before 1 – 1,5 years there were nothing like KCK. And now, the Kurdish politicians 
and the Kurdish thinkers are put into prison as if they are members of a terrorist 
organization. They were just put into jail without any interrogaing, or something. And 
for example, the right to get education and defend yourself before the court in the 
mother tongue, it's just overlooked and ignored” (Merdan 2012 [interview]). 
“I know still they [the police] are listening my phone, talks, copying my message, my 
talking. So, if you said something, there are examples. “Bring bread”. They said “This 
is code. You didn't mean this bread. You meant weapons or something like that”. It's 
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ridiculous! And they arrested people because of this situation. They, if they want, they 
can create the clues, to make a bond between you and KCK. And actually, I don't know 
what's the KCK, what are they doing. Two months, three years ago, it's impossible that 
they can arrest so many people in an action” (Efo 2012 [interview]). The interviewees 
generally emphasized frustration with the police and police actions.  
More specifically, the situation in the workplace seemed to be a topic of 
discrimination. As one of the trade union members emphasized: “Back then, the 
workers (…) who were attempting getting their rights were accused of being 
Communist. (…) Now, the employers are just using the same methods for the Kurdish 
people. “Merdan” is one of the best representatives in this area. But before the 
elections, there were gossips, rumours, against “Merdan” saying that he is a 
Communist and a Kurd or Alevi” (Reswan 2012 [interview]).  
When asked about this, Merdan responds: “I was going for the upper management, but 
they were advocating, promoting nationalists. Just this discourse. And they were also 
looking into ethnic or political background of people, and just going for the 
nationalistic agenda, so the people from particular background could not be in the 
upper management” (Merdan 2012 [interview]). The issue of discrimination was 
repeatedly mentioned in the interviews, and there was no mentioning of the situation 
improving within the later years.   
 
5.8.3. Assimilated v non-assimilated Kurds   
“Today, there are more Kurds living in Istanbul than in any other part of the Kurdish 
regions. Now, if tomorrow there would be an attempt to come to a modus vivendi with 
the Kurds, there would be a great disagreement between those who are established 
and living here and the others “over there” (Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview]).   
The interviewees seemed to agree that there is a difference between Kurds who have 
been assimilated and Kurds who have resisted assimilation. The discussions in the 
trade union, for instance, found that the people getting jobs in the upper management 
would be “Sunni Islam, conservative nationalistic and racist outlook. For example, 
Kurdish people who share the same opinions [i.e. assimilated Kurds (…) can be in the 
upper management. (…) If a Kurd was pro them, there's no problem» (Reswan 2012 
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[interview]). This corresponds to the feeling of discrimination if you are a Kurd openly 
stating your ethnic identity. According to Romano (2006:4), in Turkey there is hardly 
any discrimination against Kurds who assimilate to the dominant – Turkish – culture. 
All these statements emphasize the young Kurds’ feelings of frustration and a sense 
they are being discriminated against. When feeling frustrated about for instance 
cultural or linguistic cleavages, this gives room for mobilization based on identity 
(Varshny 2003: 93), again reinforcing the challenges of a more prominent Kurdish 
identity.   
 
5.9. RQ2 Kurdish demands  
“(S)uggesting minority rights reform in Turkey (...) is a truly difficult task. To suggest 
the magnitude of the demands a number of factors should be examined, in particular 
what the minorities' own demands are” (Karimova & Deverell 2001: 21, own 
emphasis). Coming back to Yildiz’ quote in the outset of the analysis, do the young 
Kurds feel like they do have a say in their own futures? What are their demands? EU 
progress reports have repeatedly called for the recognition of the Kurdish identity by 
Turkey, focusing on granting Kurds cultural rights (Karakoc 2010: 930). What are the 
views of the young Kurds?   
“(...) people think that it's 40 years for example PKK established, and 40 years people 
dying, and now it is not enough just to say that you can speak. “Okay, you are Kurdish 
and can speak Kurdish”. Before 30 years or 50 years ago they also speak Kurdish, 
and they never stopped to speak Kurdish. It is not the point, I think. They have lots of 
pain and they want to, kind of, payment for that” (Dilara 2012 [interview]). This 
would suggest that the Kurds have broad demands. Throughout the interviews, it 
became clear that three core issues stood out. These were increased legal 
developments, stronger linguistic rights for Kurds and a focus on dialogue between 
Kurds and the Turkish government.  
 
5.9.1. Increased legal developments  
“I think the laws and the government should be changed so it's new (…) People follow 
laws. We do follow laws. And we think that it's kind of – I think that if a law is saying 
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that Kurdish people are capable of, are allowed to speak and study in their own 
language, then the Turkish people will accept it by time” (Robar 2012 [interview]).  
“It's not just cultural rights, because they saw that if you get just cultural rights, and if 
you don't have any effect about economy, in your district, you can't do anything. Also, 
if [your rights are] not mentioned in constitutional rights, it's also nothing” (Dilara 
2012 [interview]). This demonstrates a desire for increased legal developments, 
granting the Kurds wider constitutional protections. Emphasis was also put on that 
such changes would have to be implemented by the government, to avoid changes 
being only “on the surface”.  
 
5.9.2 Language issues  
Issues regarding language came up repeatedly in the interviews. “I can understand my 
grandparents but my little sister cannot understand them (…) I can speak Kurdish (…) 
because I spent lots of time with my parents and when was I child there was no 
television like now. (…) Less people [are] speaking Kurdish. Because they watch TV 
and they don't speak, and in school they can't speak Kurdish” (Dilara 2012 
[interview]).  
Another respondent had recently started using his Kurdish name. “So, right now I'm in 
the court actually to get my real [Kurdish] name. Because they said me that, that 
[X][Kurdish name] was quite difficult to pronounce, and they just gave me [Z] 
[Turkish name] in the registrar's office. My mother uses the name [X]. I’m having 
difficulties finding a job for example, because of my name. [The Turkish government] 
said there is no like Kurdish language. So, it's Turkish. And they also, there is also, 
there was a fear. Still there is a fear. People want to call their children in Kurdish 
letters, it's not possible” (Efo 2012[interview]). When a group insists on keeping its 
own culture and language, according to Castles (2000: 198), it may in fact turn into a 
stigma used to justify the inferiority of the minority. However, even if leading to 
marginalization, giving up the original culture and language will imply losing 
community solidarity – a vital survival aspect for any group. Thus, the Kurds uphold 




5.9.3. Dialogue and reconciliation  
Even when the dominant group gives some privileges to the minority, it is extremely 
difficult to determine what would be a “fair” and sufficient price for the dominant 
group to pay when it should also take into account past prejudices (Varshny 2003: 93). 
This can be seen in the Turkish case. It is a tough task to establish what should be fair 
concessions to give to the Kurds for their past suffering.  
“Too many things have happened, and some sort of reconciliation also needs to 
happen at the societal level, not the military or political. Some sort of truth 
commission where these things can be accepted, acknowledged and honored. All the 
past experiences and some of the bitter past experiences, that need to be 
acknowledged. And move on. And heal. It will take time” (Banias 2012 [interview]). 
According to Efo, the government “just continue saying that there is no [Kurdish]. 
But I was held in for 4 days when they took me to custody for throwing stones. (...) And 
nobody just says to you “throw stones”. For no apparent reason. If I'm throwing 
stones, well, there must be something wrong, why I'm doing it. So, they never asked me 
why I was doing it. So they can just generalize the whole situation” (Efo 2012 
[interview]).This seems to be a central aspect of the problem. The Kurdish youth feel 
frustrated about the current situation and have lost faith in the European Union as a 
“helping hand”. The sociological institutionalism point to that the Kurds might have 
gotten an increased sense of their own identity partly by EU pressure. The increased 
sense of identity amongst the Kurds has also contributed to a growing polarization in 
the Turkish society. The possible effects of this and further suggestions for research on 
the topic will be discussed in the conclusion chapter.   
 
Ch 6 Conclusion  
“Turkey is on the verge of recomposing itself, and trying to define another social 
contract. (…) [T]he emergence of a very strong ethnic identity and policies relating to 
this ethnic identity (…) they will get in conflict and violent conflict with other existing 
identity, that is the Turkish one (…) That means more clashes, and that needs very 
intelligent engineering, conflict resolution and more democracy to make sure that 
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those Kurds who feel ostracized and who feel more and more Kurdish, will end up by 
feeling citizens of Turkey” (Aktar 2012 [interview]).  
 
6.0. Research questions  
In the introduction, research questions were presented which through the use of theory 
and methods should be answered in the best way possible. Looking at the role of EU 
pressure in Turkey on the individual’s identity perceptions has proved to be an 
interesting, however complicated issue. One has to go all the way back to the 
formation of the Turkish state to find the answers as to why the state has acted the way 
it has in the realms of minority rights. The making of the Turkish nation with its 
mono-identity has shaped the discourse and the attitudes of subsequent Turkish 
governments. However, even today,“sub-identities are not supposed to claim their 
identities” (Aktar 2012 [interview]). The answers given from the interviewees lead to 
an understanding that the respondents – both the Kurdish youth and the interviewed 
professors – have found that the Kurdish identity is indeed rising and becoming more 
prominent in the Turkish society. To what extent this can be attributed to EU pressure, 
is difficult to determine, and one has to take into consideration actors such as the PKK, 
its release of “pacific forces” (Gambetti 2009: 54) and the more “Kurdish-friendly” 
stance of the AKP (Yilmaz 2012: 4) in addition to the pressure of civil society. This is 
somewhat reflected in some of the statements from the young Kurds. “The EU is not 
in the Kurdish people's agenda. They are just fighting for their own rights for 90 
years. It's just a secondary agenda” (Ferhat 2012 [interview]). Although the 
interviews cannot reveal whether the EU is seen as the main or only reason for a rise 
of Kurdish identity, the majority of the respondents did state that the EU had been an 
important factor in achieving increased recognition for the Kurds as a group. An 
example of increased recognition is the Turkish mainstream media, having changed 
considerably when it comes to recognizing the Kurdish ethnicity. This has implied 
changes in the public discourse (Somer 2005: 592). The recognition of the ethnic 
group could, as Varshny (2003: 92) suggests, in itself imply increased identity 





6.1. Theoretical considerations  
As the sociological institutionalism suggests, Europeanization and EU pressure should 
lead to internalization of new norms and identities. Indeed, the EU pressure has led 
many controversial issues to be dealt with and the EU has had a positive impact on the 
development of minority rights in Turkey (Yilmaz 2012: 3). In this way, 
Europeanization can be seen as having contributed to a strengthening of the Kurdish 
identity – however perhaps not creating new identities so much as laying the grounds 
for a strengthening of an already existing identity. When speaking of norms, one can 
see that EU ideas and norms trigger organizations in the domestic sphere working for 
European norms and beliefs (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 9). This would imply a change 
and internalization of new norms, focusing on more European ideals and standards.   
The involvement of the EU in minority rights protection is not uncontested; as seen in 
the outset, the EU lacks standards of dealing with minority right protection, including 
even defining what a “minority” is (Yilmaz 2012: 4). The EU has been criticized for 
having an ambiguous minority policy, lacking clear and comprehensive rules and 
regulations. Still, the respondents seem to have been of the opinion that membership in 
the EU would matter and that a membership would lead to a difference in their own 
situation. Here, one can see that the respondents agreed that EU has been important, 
perhaps in particular for the minorities, who despite the criticisms have had faith in the 
leverage of the EU. EU pressure may have seen to have led to a more democratic 
Turkish society focusing on freedom of expression, which in turn has made it easier 
for Kurds to state their objectives (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010: 32). This was recognized in 
the interviews. The respondents all signaled a weakened faith in the EU and the EU 
leverage, particularly in relation to the so-called Kurdish issue. The general response 
was that the EU had lost its leverage, also in pushing for minority rights related 
reforms. The young Kurds seemed frustrated about this development. They also 
displayed a willingness to continue to “fight” for increased Kurdish minority rights 
without any EU pressure. “But Kurds will continue to combat. Maybe they will just 
pay a lot of things for it” (Merdan 2012 [interview]). This could suggest that the faith 
in the EU was not as substantial as claimed; however could also point to a more 
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prominent Kurdish identity, which makes further Kurdish demands impossible to halt 
or diminish and which might ultimately lead to further violent conflict. Although 
acknowledging that the situation for the Kurds has somewhat improved in the last 
years, the majority of the respondents were still of the opinion that Kurds were being 
discriminated against in the Turkish society. Changes have indeed happened according 
to EU demands, however Turkey still fails to meet international standards when 
speaking of minority rights. The core of their understanding remains intact (Kizilkan-
Kisacik 2010: 26). Turkey also sees a growing polarization according to the 
respondents. According to Somer (2008: 229), reforms pursued by the Turkish 
government caused by EU pressure gave the Kurds cultural-linguistic rights never seen 
before in Turkey. The reforms, however, failed to create feelings of “equality” among 
both Kurdish nationalists and much of the Kurdish population (Somer 2008: 229). It is 
also argued that the EU’s pressure on recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic 
rights led to a nourishing of a nationalist discourse from portions of the Turkish 
military and nationalistic agents (Karakoc 2010: 934). The interviewees, however, 
agreed that there were increasingly open discussions on the distinctions between Kurds 
and Turks. Identity politics has changed considerably within the past couple of 
decades. Today, issues of identity, minority rights and culture are discussed amongst 
Kurds and Turks alike. According to Updegraff (2012: 120), previously, even talking 
about a separate Kurdish identity – or an issue such as minority rights – could have 
taken one into prison. The reason for this change is partly Kurdish people moving into 
different regions of Turkey – but also partly because of liberalized policies. These 
liberalized policies, as have been seen, have been pushed forward by EU reforms. 
As have been seen, if a growing polarization exists in the Turkish society with 
weakened EU conditionality and other enforcement mechanisms to pressure Turkey to 
further reforms, what could be possible solutions for the Kurds?   
 
6.2. What could be solutions?   
“…if you ask my opinion, I think, I mean, a reasonable autonomy, would be the very 
best thing. But it's very difficult because this party [the AK Party], doesn't, I mean they 
don't want to, they for some time they were in favour of an autonomy. Now, they are 
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absolutely against it. Became very nationalist” (Abadan-Unat 2012 [interview]). The 
questions of autonomy also came up repeatedly in the interviews and seemed like an 
element important for the young Kurds.  
Does the mere existence of an ethnic identity create problems for individuals or for the 
unity of a society? Professor Irene Banias claims, “I think for the years when Kurdish 
was not taught or not being allowed, or Kurdish media were not allowed, this led to 
Turkification of a lot of Kurdish people. I see this as a positive sign, to be a Turkish 
citizen but also have a cultural identity. That's a plus. That's a richer society rather 
than being a threat to the security” (Banias 2012 [interview]). Having dual identities 
has not proven to diminish a person’s well-being. The same can be said on a societal 
level, where citizens holding such dual identities do not diminish national attachment 
(Berry 2997: 317).  Thus, a society with individuals having more than one identity 
may be an option in the future.  
 
6.3. Methodological reflections   
Hopefully my role as a “fellow student” or “fellow young person” made the 
informants open even more up to me as an interviewer. The interviewees all seemed 
relaxed in meeting with another young person who had travelled all the way to their 
country to hear their stories and listen to them. As noted, case studies can only 
conclude tentatively on how much a variable affects the outcome in a case (George & 
Bennett 2005: 25). Still, one might see that the variable Europeanization pressure has 
had some effect on the outcome of a more prominent Kurdish ethnic identity – and the 
consequences this has had on the individual might be an interesting starting point for 
further research on the topic. The small sample of interviewees makes generalization 
of this very difficult, but hopefully the findings can pave the way for bigger research 
on the topic. It could be interesting to expand the topic to include more interviews. 
Talking to people working closely with Kurdish youth to get a broader understanding 
of the topic of increasing Kurdish identity and decreasing Europeanization would also 
be of interest. Importantly, one needs to take into account that the informants might be 
biased, not wanting to share their real opinions and reflections and merely repeating 
what they believe the researcher wants to hear. The task set out was to explore the 
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possible linkages between pressures from the EU level and changes in self-perception 
and identity awareness amongst young Kurds in Turkey. The material examined 
suggests that to some extent there has been a correlation. However, indicators also 
shed doubt about the impact of Europeanization pressure on minority rights awareness 
and understanding. Thus, more research on the topic is needed, preferably with a larger 
sample of interviewees and a broader spectrum of different sources, for instance 
organizations working for Kurdish rights and politicians. In addition, as mentioned, 
one cannot be sure that the Kurdish identity has not risen due to other factors such as 
the PKK struggle or international acknowledgement of minority rights. This 
spuriousness is hard to determine – however, the respondents seemed confident in 
their beliefs that the EU did have an impact on the rise of the Kurdish identity.   
 
6.4. The way forward  
“Kurdish identity, as a subject of an unsolved question, keeps alive the perceptions of 
threats to the permanence of the Turkish state” (Karakoc 2010: 937). Generations of 
silencing the Kurds have not led to a solution to the conflict – perhaps another way of 
dealing with the problem is needed. The importance of the Kurdish youth feeling that 
they have a say, that they are seen, is of vital importance. When even limited rights 
granted to the Kurds by the government can be seen as having diminished the core 
PKK support base (Yilmaz 2012), one should believe that granting the Kurds even 
further rights would be the right way to go. The results from the semi-structured 
interviews point to factors such as a current lack of leverage of the EU and also a lack 
of communication between the young Kurds and the Turkish government. The young 
Kurds are feeling frustrated and that the Turkish government is not taking their 
opinions into account. The results suggest that the Kurds have obtained a stronger 
identity. It is difficult to say to what extent this has been made possible due to EU 
pressure, however this stronger identity is now demanding its position in the Turkish 
public sphere. Without the feeling of having their own say in their own futures and 
without enforcement mechanisms such as the conditionality of EU membership, 
Turkey might very well end up with an even more polarized society that what we see 
today. A more extensive sample is needed in order to further investigate the 
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implications of the lack of Europeanization and the rise of the Kurdish identity on 
Kurdish youth, however this thesis suggests a sense of frustration and hopelessness 
combined with a strong desire to express their own ethnic identity. What is clear is that 
this problem will not go away without thoughtful and tactful measures from the 
government. “Conflict resolution for this sort of protracted conflicts, takes ages. Takes 
decades” (Aktar 2012 [interview]). Hopefully, new approaches will lead to less 
tension and an increased understanding and appreciation of the finely tuned 
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